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Punitive Damages, Due Process, and 
Employment Discrimination 
Joseph A. Seiner 
The Supreme Court has failed to provide any substantive guidance on when 
punitive damages are appropriate in employment discrimination cases since 
it issued its seminal decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n over 
twelve years ago. The Court has recently expanded its punitive damages 
jurisprudence in the high-profile decisions of Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. While these cases 
dramatically altered the way exemplary relief is analyzed in civil cases, the 
extent to which these decisions apply in the workplace context remains 
unclear. Surprisingly, there has been almost no academic literature to date 
explaining how Philip Morris and Exxon impact punitive damages 
claims brought by employment discrimination plaintiffs. This Article seeks to 
fill that substantial void in the scholarship, looking specifically at the 
potential due process implications. 
Navigating the recent Supreme Court cases, this Article proposes a uniform 
analytical framework for analyzing punitive damages in cases brought 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The model proposed in this 
Article provides a blueprint for courts and litigants when considering 
whether punitive relief is appropriate in an employment discrimination case. 
If adopted, the model set forth in this Article would resolve much of the 
uncertainty that currently exists in the lower courts over how to apply the 
remedial provisions of Title VII—as interpreted through the confusing 
Kolstad decision—to employment discrimination claims. This Article 
explains how this proposed framework would bring much more efficiency to 
the judicial process and help define the future of workplace punitive 
damages. 
 
   Associate professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law. The author 
would like to thank Charles Sullivan, Michael Zimmer, Sandra Sperino, Benjamin Gutman, and 
Megan Seiner for their extremely helpful thoughts and comments on this paper. The author 
would also like to thank the participants at the Fifth Annual Colloquium on Current 
Scholarship in Labor & Employment Law (held at the Washington University School of Law 
and the Saint Louis University School of Law) for their helpful feedback. This Article is 
dedicated to Stephen J. Seiner, Alice A. Seiner, John E. Sweeney, Joan D. Sweeney, and 
grandparents everywhere for all the love and support that they so selflessly provide. Any errors 
in this Article are entirely my own. 
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Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with 
restraint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. 
Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating potential for 
harm. 
—Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Punitive damages have often captured the attention of the public, 
particularly where the awards have provided substantial relief for the victims 
involved.2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) was amended 
in 1991 to include exemplary relief.3 Unfortunately, punitive damages were 
added to the statute with no clear guidance on when this form of relief is 
appropriate in workplace discrimination cases.4 
More than a decade has passed since the Supreme Court provided its 
clearest statement of how punitive damages should be analyzed under Title 
VII. In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, the Court looked to agency principles 
to determine when an employer can be subject to exemplary relief.5 While 
Kolstad resolved many questions for this area of the law, it also generated 
significant confusion in the lower courts over the proper standard to apply 
in workplace cases. Most notably, the decision does little to resolve the 
question of what “malice or . . . reckless indifference”6 means under the 
statute, and the courts have issued varied and conflicting opinions on this 
issue.7 
The confusion in this area of the law has become more pronounced 
after the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on punitive damages in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker8 and Philip Morris USA v. Williams,9 which both arose 
 
 1. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See 
generally Developments in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1784–85 
(2000) (comparing the criticisms of punitive damages); Richard W. Murphy, Superbifurcation: 
Making Room for State Prosecution in the Punitive Damages Process, 76 N.C. L. REV. 463, 467 (1998) 
(same). 
 2. See generally Murphy, supra note 1, at 467 (discussing punitive damages); Developments 
in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 1, at 1783–88 (same). 
 3. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)). This Article uses the terms punitive damages and 
exemplary damages interchangeably. 
 4. See id. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment 
Discrimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735 (2008) (discussing punitive 
damages in employment discrimination cases). 
 5. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). 
 7. See infra Part III (discussing the various approaches of the lower courts when analyzing 
punitive damages in the employment discrimination context). 
 8. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 9. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
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outside of the employment discrimination context and involved due process 
questions. In Philip Morris, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment permits a jury to consider harm incurred by 
strangers to the litigation for purposes of considering reprehensibility—but 
not punishment—when awarding punitive relief.10 More recently, in Exxon, 
the Court held that where federal common law is in place to address 
punitive damages, due process concerns are not implicated.11 While these 
cases represent a sea change for how punitive damages should be analyzed, 
the Supreme Court has not provided any guidance on whether these 
decisions should impact employment discrimination plaintiffs. Indeed, the 
Court has not offered any substantive guidance in this area since the Kolstad 
decision was issued, more than a dozen years ago. 
Much more surprisingly, there has been almost no discussion in the 
academic literature of how Exxon and Philip Morris affect a Title VII 
plaintiff’s right to relief.12 In fact, there has been little written in recent years 
on the topic of workplace punitive damages at all.13 This Article seeks to fill 
this void in the scholarship and to provide guidance on when punitive 
damages are appropriate in the employment discrimination context. 
This Article proposes an analytical framework that can be applied to 
Title VII cases to determine whether a punitive damages claim should 
proceed.14 Navigating the Kolstad decision, as well as other Supreme Court 
case law, this Article provides a blueprint for courts and litigants to follow 
when analyzing whether exemplary relief is appropriate in an employment 
discrimination case. The analytical framework set forth in this Article makes 
sense of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Philip Morris and Exxon.15 By 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Exxon, 554 U.S. 471. 
 12. Cf. Paul Edgar Harold & Tracy L. Cole, Darned if You Due Process, Darned if You Don’t! 
Understanding the Due Process Dilemma for Punitive Damages in Title VII Class Actions, 30 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 453 (2008) (discussing punitive damages in Title VII class-action cases and 
addressing the impact of the Philip Morris decision). 
 13. See, for example, the following articles, all of which discuss punitive damages in 
employment discrimination cases: Michael C. Harper, Eliminating the Need for Caps on Title VII 
Damage Awards: The Shield of Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 477 (2011); Sandra Sperino, The New Calculus of Punitive Damages for Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 701 (2010); Sandra Sperino, Judicial Preemption of Punitive 
Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 227 (2009); Kelly Koenig Levi, Allowing a Title VII Punitive Damage 
Award Without an Accompanying Compensatory or Nominal Award: Further Unifying the Federal Civil 
Rights Laws, 89 KY. L.J. 581 (2001); Judith J. Johnson, A Uniform Standard for Exemplary Damages 
in Employment Discrimination Cases, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 41 (1999); Judith J. Johnson, A Standard 
for Punitive Damages Under Title VII, 46 FLA. L. REV. 521 (1994). 
 14. See infra Part IV (proposing a new analytical framework for analyzing whether punitive 
relief is appropriate in a Title VII case). See generally Seiner, supra note 4 (discussing analysis of 
punitive damages in employment discrimination cases). 
 15. See infra Parts III–IV (discussing applicability of recent Supreme Court decisions to 
Title VII claims). 
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explaining how these cases should apply to Title VII claims, the proposed 
analytical framework could help avoid years of unnecessary litigation. 
Through this newly proposed model for analyzing punitive damages in the 
workplace, this Article seeks to provide clarity and simplicity to a currently 
confused area of the law. I have previously argued for replacing the punitive 
damages scheme of Title VII with a more streamlined liquidated-damages 
approach similar to that used in age discrimination cases.16 Nonetheless, to 
the extent punitive damages are still used in this area of the law, a more 
simplified approach is necessary. This Article offers that approach. At the 
outset, it is worth noting that this Article focuses exclusively on punitive 
damages in Title VII cases and does not explore the question of exemplary 
relief under other civil-rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981.17 Where this 
Article discusses employment discrimination or workplace plaintiffs, then, it 
is specifically referencing those individuals bringing claims pursuant to Title 
VII. 
This Article begins by exploring the Supreme Court decisions in 
Kolstad, Exxon, and Philip Morris, and explains how these cases impact Title 
VII employment discrimination plaintiffs seeking punitive relief.18 This 
Article further examines the purpose and role of punitive damages in our 
society, as well as the importance of adding this form of relief to Title VII.19 
Next, this Article explores the confusion in the lower courts over how Kolstad 
should apply to employment discrimination cases, noting that this 
uncertainty will only grow after the more recent Supreme Court case law on 
punitive relief.20 Navigating Kolstad and the recent case law on punitive 
damages, this Article proposes a uniform analytical framework for 
determining when punitive relief is appropriate in an employment 
discrimination case brought under Title VII.21 The Article concludes by 
addressing the implications of adopting the proposed model and explaining 
the intricacies and limitations of this new analytical framework.22 This Article 
suggests that the proposed model would provide significant efficiency to the 
judicial process through a simple, uniform analysis of punitive relief in Title 
VII cases.23 
 
 16. See generally Seiner, supra note 4 (discussing punitive damages in employment 
discrimination cases). 
 17. See infra Part V (discussing limitations of the model proposed in this Article). 
 18. See infra Parts II–III (discussing the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on 
punitive relief in employment discrimination cases). 
 19. See infra Part III.A (discussing purpose and role of exemplary relief). 
 20. See infra Part III.D (discussing confusion in lower courts over Kolstad standard). 
 21. See infra Part IV (setting forth proposed framework). 
 22. See infra Parts V–VI (discussing limitations and implications of proposed framework). 
 23. See infra Part VI (discussing implications of the proposed framework). 
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II. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has provided substantive guidance 
on the applicability of punitive damages to civil cases.24 Little of this 
guidance has been in the employment discrimination context, however. The 
seminal case in this area, Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, is now over a dozen 
years old and represents the Court’s clearest expression of how to assess 
punitive damages in the workplace. 
In Kolstad, the Court considered a case where the plaintiff alleged sex 
discrimination pursuant to Title VII.25 The plaintiff in that case, Carole 
Kolstad, asserted that the American Dental Association had failed to 
promote her because of her gender.26 Kolstad maintained that the selection 
procedures used in deciding who would receive a promotion were a “sham,” 
and that a male had been chosen for the position before the process had 
even started.27 The plaintiff also introduced evidence showing that the 
acting head of the office had used derogatory language when referring to 
professional women and had told jokes that were sexually inappropriate.28 
The district court rejected the plaintiff’s request that a punitive damages 
instruction be given to the jury.29 The jury ultimately awarded backpay of 
$52,718 in the case, finding that the American Dental Association had 
discriminated against Kolstad on the basis of her gender.30 
The plaintiff appealed the district court’s refusal to give the punitive 
damages instruction, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that a 
showing of extraordinary egregiousness was not required and that “the state 
of mind necessary to trigger liability for the wrong is at least as culpable as 
that required to make punitive damages applicable.”31 Rehearing the case en 
banc, the D.C. Circuit limited punitive damages in Title VII cases to those 
instances where the defendant has engaged in some type of “egregious” 
conduct.32 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case to address the 
standard for awarding punitive damages under Title VII.33 The Court noted 
 
 24. See infra Part II (discussing Exxon and Philip Morris decisions). 
 25. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 531 (1999). See generally Seiner, supra note 
4, at 751–56 (discussing Kolstad). 
 26. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 530–31. 
 27. Id. at 531. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 532. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 532–33 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 
1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32. Id. at 533 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 139 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33. Id. 
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that the structure of the statute “suggests a congressional intent to authorize 
punitive awards in only a subset of cases involving intentional 
discrimination.”34 Thus, the statute is two-tiered: it provides a basis for 
finding liability and a separate, “higher standard” for awarding punitive 
relief.35 The Court rejected the appellate court’s view, however, that there 
must be a certain level of egregiousness for awarding punitive relief, and 
noted instead that “[t]he terms ‘malice’ and ‘reckless’ ultimately focus on 
the actor’s state of mind.”36 
The Court then proceeded to define what “with malice or with reckless 
indifference” means in the Title VII context. The Court held that under the 
statute, “an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived 
risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages.”37 
The Court explained that there could thus be a subset of cases where an 
employer intentionally discriminates but is not ultimately liable for 
exemplary relief. Most notably, the employer might not have knowledge of 
the federal law that it is violating.38 Or the employer may act intentionally 
but with the view that its discrimination does not violate the statute or that 
its conduct falls within an exception.39 In such scenarios, the employer 
would still be liable under Title VII but would not be subject to punitive 
relief. 
In addition to requiring an employer to possess knowledge that its 
conduct is in violation of Title VII, the Court further required that the 
plaintiff impute liability to the defendant through the principles of agency.40 
Walking through the text of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Court 
noted that liability can be imputed where the employer “authorizes or 
ratifies the agent’s tortious act”41 or where the individual perpetrating the 
discrimination is a manager “acting in the scope of employment.”42 Midlevel 
managers would satisfy the Court’s interpretation of the Restatement, as the 
individual “must be ‘important,’ but perhaps need not be the employer’s 
‘top management, officers, or directors,’ to be acting ‘in a managerial 
capacity.’”43 
 
 34. Id. at 534. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 535. The Court clarified, however, that “egregious or outrageous acts may serve 
as evidence supporting an inference of the requisite ‘evil motive.’” Id. at 538. 
 37. Id. at 536. 
 38. Id. at 536–37. 
 39. Id. at 537. 
 40. Id. at 540–41. 
 41. Id. at 542–43. 
 42. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 43. Id. at 543 (quoting 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
§ 4.4(B)(2)(a), at 181 (3d ed. 1995)). 
A3 - SEINER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:52 PM 
480 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:473 
The Court did provide a defense for employers, however, that would 
exempt them from liability for punitive damages. Where an employer makes 
“good faith efforts” to comply with the statute, vicarious liability should not 
be imposed.44 The Court provided that “implementing programs or policies 
to prevent discrimination in the workplace” or other “prophylactic” 
measures would help satisfy this good-faith defense.45 Thus, in its opinion, 
the Court sought to promote the use of “antidiscrimination policies” and 
efforts “to educate [a company’s] personnel on Title VII’s prohibitions.”46 
In conclusion, the Court made clear that egregious conduct is not 
necessary to secure punitive relief under Title VII. Rather, the plaintiff must 
produce sufficient evidence “to support an inference that the requisite 
mental state can be imputed” to the employer.47 The Court also carved out a 
defense that would exempt an employer from punitive damages where the 
employer establishes that it was acting in good faith. Applying this test, the 
Court remanded the matter for further consideration on the principles it set 
forth in the case.48 
More recently, the Supreme Court has expounded upon its punitive 
damages jurisprudence, though outside of the workplace context. In Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, the Court addressed the question of whether a 
company can be subjected to punitive damages for harm to third parties not 
part of the litigation.49 In Philip Morris, an individual’s estate sued a cigarette 
manufacturer under state law for negligence and deceit related to his death, 
which was the result of smoking.50 Finding for the plaintiff, the jury awarded 
$821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in exemplary relief.51 
The company objected to the verdict on the grounds that the ratio of 
compensatory relief to punitive damages was in excess of what the 
Constitution allows.52 Additionally, Philip Morris argued that the trial court 
had erred in failing to instruct the jury that punitive damages could not be 
awarded to punish the company for harms on behalf of others not party to 
the litigation.53 Specifically, the company noted that plaintiff’s counsel had 
referenced the widespread damage that Philip Morris cigarettes had caused 
to the general population, and the company maintained that this was an 
improper consideration for awarding punitive relief.54 
 
 44. Id. at 544. 
 45. Id. at 545. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 546. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007). 
 50. Id. at 349–50. 
 51. Id. at 350. 
 52. Id. at 351. 
 53. Id. at 350–51. 
 54. Id. 
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Addressing the question of whether a jury may award punitive damages 
on the basis of third-party effects, the Court held that “the Constitution’s 
Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to 
punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom 
they directly represent.”55 The Court noted that due process requires that an 
individual cannot be punished without having the opportunity to present a 
full defense.56 A defendant will be unable to avail itself of an adequate 
defense where the accusations of injury come from “strangers to the 
litigation.”57 Thus, in this case, the company would be unable to establish 
that individuals injured from cigarette smoking “knew that smoking was 
dangerous or did not rely upon the defendant’s statements to the contrary,” 
if those persons were not party to the litigation.58 Perhaps more importantly, 
the Court warned that allowing punishment for nonparty harm would result 
in “a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation.”59 
Thus, the Court was clear that exemplary relief cannot be used to 
“punish[] a defendant for harming others.”60 The Court did acknowledge, 
however, that a jury may consider reprehensibility when awarding punitive 
damages and that nonparty harm may factor into that determination.61 The 
Court therefore distinguished reprehensibility from punishment when 
considering third-party harm for purposes of awarding exemplary relief. 
Interestingly, the Kolstad Court downplayed the importance of considering 
reprehensibility when awarding punitive relief for workplace claims, stating 
that “the reprehensible character of the conduct is not generally considered 
apart from the requisite state of mind.”62 
Having concluded that a jury may consider harm to strangers for 
purposes of considering reprehensibility—but not punishment—when 
awarding punitive damages, the Court remanded the case for the lower 
court to apply this new standard.63 The Court further found it unnecessary 
to address the question of whether the award itself was “grossly excessive.”64 
 
 55. Id. at 353. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 353–54. 
 59. Id. at 354. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 355. 
 62. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999). 
 63. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 357–58. The Court was also clear that state courts must 
provide some procedures to make certain that a jury is only considering harm to strangers for 
purposes of reprehensibility, rather than punishment, where there is a risk of confusion. Id. at 
357. A state does have flexibility in determining exactly what those procedures should look like. 
Id. 
 64. Id. at 358. 
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In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court again addressed the 
appropriateness of an award of punitive relief.65 In Exxon, the Court 
examined a case where the crew of an oil tanker ran aground the ship off 
the coast of Alaska, resulting in a spill of an enormous amount of crude oil 
into Prince William Sound.66 Joseph Hazelwood, who captained the tanker, 
was a recovering alcoholic.67 There was evidence to suggest, however, that 
Hazelwood had relapsed, and that Exxon management was aware of his 
difficulties.68 Indeed, there was testimony that on the night of the spill the 
captain consumed approximately five double vodkas prior to departing on 
the ship.69 Hazelwood left the bridge two minutes before a critical turn 
needed to be made, and those left to man the ship failed to properly 
navigate the vessel.70 The ship crashed into a reef, resulting in an oil spill of 
eleven million gallons.71 
Exxon stipulated to negligence before the District Court for the District 
of Alaska, and a trial was held on the issue of recklessness.72 After this trial, 
the jury concluded that the captain and Exxon were reckless and could thus 
be subject to exemplary damages.73 In the next phase of the trial, the jury 
awarded compensatory relief.74 In the final phase of the trial, the jury 
awarded $5 billion in punitive damages against the company.75 This award 
was reduced to $2.5 billion on appeal.76 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether this award was appropriate under maritime 
law and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).77 
The Court considered Exxon’s argument that the CWA preempts an 
award of exemplary relief under maritime common law.78 Rejecting the 
company’s position, the Court saw “no clear indication of congressional 
intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies.”79 The Court thus 
turned to the amount of the punitive damages award and Exxon’s position 
that the relief “exceed[ed] the bounds justified by the punitive damages 
 
 65. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 66. Id. at 476–78. 
 67. Id. at 476. 
 68. Id. at 476–77. 
 69. Id. at 477. 
 70. Id. at 477–78. 
 71. Id. at 478. 
 72. Id. at 480. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 481. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 484–89. 
 79. Id. at 89; see also id. (“[N]or for that matter do we perceive that punitive damages for 
private harms will have any frustrating effect on the CWA remedial scheme, which would point 
to preemption.”). 
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goal of deterring reckless (or worse) behavior and the consequently 
heightened threat of harm.”80 Tracing the history of exemplary relief, the 
Court noted that the current consensus is that this form of relief is “aimed 
not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful 
conduct.”81 The Court explained the purpose of these “twin goals,” noting 
that: 
 Under the umbrellas of punishment and its aim of deterrence, 
degrees of relative blameworthiness are apparent. Reckless conduct 
is not intentional or malicious, nor is it necessarily callous toward 
the risk of harming others, as opposed to unheedful of it. Action 
taken or omitted in order to augment profit represents an 
enhanced degree of punishable culpability, as of course does willful 
or malicious action, taken with a purpose to injure.82 
The Court further pointed out that larger punitive damages awards are 
considered particularly appropriate where it is difficult to detect the 
wrongdoing and where injury and compensatory awards are likely to be 
low.83 Examining the literature, the Court noted that there is “an overall 
restraint” in the courts when awarding punitive relief, with a median ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages “less than 1:1.”84 The Court further 
stated that while due process concerns can be implicated with large punitive 
damages awards, this case was brought under federal maritime law, and thus 
“precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional 
standard.”85 Indeed, the Court’s “due process cases . . . have all involved 
awards subject in the first instance to state law.”86 Thus, the Court’s “enquiry 
differs from due process review because the case arises under federal 
maritime jurisdiction, and we are reviewing a jury award for conformity with 
maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by due process.”87 
Considering several studies on punitive damages, and rejecting the 
approach used by several states, the Court concluded that a 1:1 ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages “is a fair upper limit in such maritime 
cases.”88 The Court noted that this upper threshold will still protect the goals 
of deterrence and punishment necessary for effective exemplary relief, while 
 
 80. Id. at 490. 
 81. Id. at 492. 
 82. Id. at 493–94 (citation omitted). 
 83. Id. at 494. 
 84. Id. at 497–99. 
 85. Id. at 501–02. 
 86. Id. The Court further explained, “[o]ur review of punitive damages today, then, 
considers not their intersection with the Constitution, but the desirability of regulating them as 
a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with this Court as a source of judge-made 
law in the absence of statute.” Id. at 502. 
 87. Id. at 501–02. 
 88. Id. at 512–13. 
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preventing “unpredictable and unnecessary” awards in maritime cases.89 The 
Court further found this ratio appropriate in light of the criminal penalties 
set forth in the CWA.90 And though the case was not considered under due 
process principles, these guidelines further supported the ratio established 
by the Court.91 The Court noted that its previous jurisprudence in this 
regard concluded that “a single-digit maximum is appropriate in all but the 
most exceptional of cases.”92 
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court concluded 
that the punitive damages in the case should not exceed the compensatory 
award of $507.5 million.93 The Court thus vacated the $2.5 billion punitive 
award and remanded the case to the appellate court.94 
III. KOLSTAD REFINED: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW FOR WORKPLACE 
PLAINTIFFS 
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Philip Morris and Exxon provide 
substantial guidance for awarding exemplary relief in all areas of the law. 
These cases similarly help refine the decade-plus-old Kolstad decision and 
provide significant direction for plaintiffs seeking relief as a result of 
workplace discrimination. Much more guidance is needed, however, as the 
lower courts remain confused over when exemplary relief is appropriate for 
workplace claims.95 This Article helps provide direction to employment 
discrimination litigants and the courts by proposing a blueprint for awarding 
relief in Title VII cases. Before considering this proposed model, however, 
we must first examine the purpose of punitive damages in the workplace and 
how the recent case law has further defined the role of awarding exemplary 
relief in this context. 
This Part thus provides an overview of the current state of the law for 
punitive damages in Title VII claims and identifies the basic principles for 
employment discrimination litigants to take away from the Kolstad, Philip 
Morris, and Exxon decisions. This Part further illustrates the significant 
difficulty the lower courts are experiencing as they grapple with the statutory 
standard and Supreme Court case law on workplace punitive damages. 
A. PURPOSE AND ROLE OF WORKPLACE PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
In attempting to understand how Kolstad and other Supreme Court 
decisions impact employment discrimination litigants, we must first examine 
 
 89. Id. at 513. 
 90. Id. at 514. 
 91. See id. at 514–15. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 515. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See infra Part III.D (outlining the confusion in the courts over awarding punitive relief 
to employment discrimination claimants). 
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the purpose and role of punitive relief. Historically, punitive damages have 
served several purposes under the law.96 Perhaps the most obvious and 
important function of exemplary relief has been to punish the wrongdoer.97 
As Philip Morris demonstrates, however, there is debate over the extent to 
which punitive damages can be used to punish public, rather than private, 
harms.98 Nonetheless, punishment has long served as the key purpose for 
awarding punitive relief.99 In this regard, the defendant’s conduct is seen as 
so reprehensible that society as a whole may need to punish the offender to 
“diminish the victim’s feeling of helplessness” and to “express the 
community’s sense of outrage.”100 
Punitive damages also serve to make an example of the offender and 
deter future conduct of a similar nature.101 Thus, “[t]he linchpin for any 
economic argument in support of punitive damages is their role in deterring 
risky behavior.”102 Therefore, deterrence is often seen as a critical function 
of exemplary relief.103 Though punishment and deterrence are often cited 
as the primary bases for providing exemplary relief, other justifications exist 
as well. Most notably, providing public punitive awards is seen as a way of 
 
 96. See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 742–47 (discussing the history and purpose of 
exemplary relief); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 249–53 (2009) (same). 
 97. Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 414–15 (2008) (noting that historically punitive 
damages “were used as a form of genuine punishment . . . for private, rather than public, 
wrongs”). 
 98. Id.; Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 99. Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National Punitive Damages 
Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613, 1669 (2005) (“The retribution function is what is commonly 
referred to as punishment and is a core function of punitive damages.” (footnote omitted)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 896 (1998) (“[O]ne of the two main purposes of punitive damages is 
deterrence. . . . [P]unitive damages are intended ‘to deter the wrongdoer and others from 
committing similar wrongs in the future.’” (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 
222 (Ala. 1989))); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has 
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1984) (“Whatever justification may be 
advanced to support the punitive damage concept, however, most commentators today 
acknowledge that the modern bases undergirding the theory in the United States are 
punishment and deterrence.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 
YALE L.J. 347, 364 (2003) (“[D]eterrence is nonetheless a very significant justification for 
punitive damages, at least in certain types of torts.”). 
 102. W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental 
and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (1998). Professor Viscusi questions the deterrent effect of 
punitive relief. Id. at 288–89. 
 103. See Sharkey, supra note 101, at 363–65 (discussing the role of deterrence in punitive 
damages awards); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive 
Damage Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573, 1580 (1997) (“Punitive damages are intended as both a 
specific deterrent, so that the offending defendant will not repeat her misconduct, as well as a 
general deterrent, so that others will be dissuaded from engaging in similar misconduct.”). 
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educating citizens of their legal rights and obligations.104 In this way, 
punitive relief makes the public aware of the consequences of engaging in 
illegal acts and provides notice of the potential penalties involved with such 
unlawful conduct.105 
Similarly, punitive damages are sometimes seen as a way of adequately 
compensating a victim.106 Though prevailing plaintiffs will receive other 
damages for their injuries, punitive relief helps make them whole by 
offsetting the costs associated with bringing suit.107 Finally, it has been noted 
that punitive relief serves a law enforcement function as well.108 Thus, these 
damages “serve as a kind of bounty, inducing injured victims to serve as 
‘private attorneys general,’ increasing the number of wrongdoers who are 
pursued, prosecuted and eventually ‘brought to justice.’”109 
Though punitive damages generally can be seen as filling one or several 
of these functions—punishment, deterrence, education, compensation, and 
law enforcement110—the role of this form of relief in the employment 
discrimination context is not as clearly defined.111 Title VII provides the 
basis for plaintiffs to recover exemplary relief, stating that “[a] complaining 
party may recover punitive damages under this section . . . if the 
complaining party demonstrates that the [defendant] engaged in a 
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with 
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved 
individual.”112 
 
 104. See Gash, supra note 99, at 1671–72 (discussing the role of education in punitive 
damages awards). 
 105. See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. 
L. REV. 363, 374–75 (1994) (“Punitive damages serve a strong educative function for both the 
individual offender and society in general . . . .”). 
 106. See id. at 378–79 (“Although it is frequently said that the purpose of punitive damages 
is to punish the defendant and to deter misbehavior—not to compensate the plaintiff—punitive 
damages do indeed serve a variety of important compensatory roles.”). 
 107. Gash, supra note 99, at 1673–75 (discussing the view “that punitive damages . . . serve 
a compensatory function”). 
 108. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 
AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1451 (1993) (“A crucial function of punitive damages is to provide 
financial incentives for private parties to enforce the law—the bounty system.”); Richard A. 
Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and 
Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 43 n.32 (1983) (“[P]unitive damages encourage plaintiffs to 
press their claims and enforce the law by providing an incentive for bringing wrongdoers to 
justice.”). 
 109. Owen, supra note 105, at 381 (quoting David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products 
Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1287–88 (1976)). 
 110. See generally Owen, supra note 105, at 373–81 (discussing purposes of punitive 
damages). 
 111. See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 747–51, 775–76 (discussing role of exemplary 
relief in workplace discrimination cases and offering new model for considering damages). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006). 
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The statute also limits the amount of punitive damages that can be 
imposed on a defendant, which varies depending upon the size of the 
particular employer.113 The smallest defendants under the statute may be 
subjected to a combined $50,000 in punitive and compensatory damages.114 
The largest employers may incur a total of $300,000 in punitive and 
compensatory relief.115 Nothing in the statutory text of Title VII, however, 
addresses the purpose for providing this form of relief in the employment 
discrimination context.116 
Nonetheless, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
which amended Title VII to allow for punitive relief,117 provides some 
guidance. A report from the House of Representatives revealed that one of 
the primary purposes of this amendment to the remedial provisions of the 
statute was “to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under 
federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate 
compensation for victims of discrimination.”118 Thus, deterrence and 
compensation seemed to be the motivating rationales behind the 
legislature’s addition of exemplary relief to Title VII.119 
Supreme Court case law has recently refocused the purpose of 
exemplary relief in civil cases. The Court has provided that “[r]egardless of 
the alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is that punitives 
are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring 
harmful conduct.”120 
Thus, despite the various underlying principles provided for exemplary 
damages during the long history of this form of relief, the Court now clearly 
views deterrence and retribution as the principle purposes of punitive 
damages. These “twin goals” of punitive relief aim to prevent and punish 
 
 113. Id. § 1981a(b)(3). 
 114. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A). 
 115. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D). See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 781–83 (discussing statutory 
caps). 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 
 117. Johnson, A Standard for Punitive Damages Under Title VII, supra note 13, at 527–28 (“The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 . . . changed the remedial provisions of Title VII, allowing plaintiffs who 
proved intentional discrimination to recover compensatory and punitive damages.”); Charles A. 
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 216 
n.94 (2009) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1991 instituted both compensatory and punitive 
damages, and the concomitant right to backpay.”). See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 749–51 
(discussing legislative history and statutory revision of Title VII). 
 118. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694. See 
generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 750 (“In considering the legislation, Congress was thus clear 
that, based on the testimony before it, the addition of new remedial relief to Title VII was a 
critical component of deterring future wrongful conduct and encouraging ‘private 
enforcement’ of the statute.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 70)). 
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1. See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 749–50 
(discussing role of punitive damages in Title VII). 
 120. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008). 
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intentional, malicious, or reckless conduct of an unlawful nature.121 Though 
not identical to the purposes Congress expressed for adding punitive relief 
to Title VII, punishment and deterrence can certainly be seen as playing a 
role in civil rights litigation more broadly.122 And Congress likely saw 
deterring unlawful discriminatory conduct as one of the primary benefits of 
providing exemplary relief for workplace claims.123 
B. KOLSTAD REVISITED 
Though Kolstad fails to offer any substantial guidance on the purpose 
underlying exemplary relief, the decision does provide an important 
backdrop for punitive damages in Title VII cases. Though problematic in 
many respects, the decision remains the best statement of when exemplary 
relief can be awarded to employment discrimination plaintiffs. Thus, Kolstad 
is the best—and really only—Supreme Court decision explaining the 
parameters of punitive relief in the Title VII context. Despite the confusion 
that Kolstad creates,124 it does offer a few clear-cut principles for employment 
discrimination litigants. It is helpful to briefly highlight these principles 
before moving on to the more difficult aspects of the decision. 
Initially and importantly, the decision resolves the difficult question of 
how liability can be imputed to an employer. In many ways it is 
counterintuitive to punish a corporation or other “employer” for unlawful 
conduct when it is an individual—not the company—who has taken the 
inappropriate action. This inquiry becomes even more difficult when the 
individual taking the unlawful action is doing so against the express policies 
of the employer. Kolstad makes clear that, as in other areas of the law, we 
must rely on agency principles when considering whether to impute liability 
to the employer.125 Thus, according to the Court, liability can be imputed 
where a supervisor “authorizes or ratifies the agent’s tortious act,”126 or 
 
 121. Id. at 492–94. 
 122. See generally Cynthia L. Alexander, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading 
Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595, 617–18 (1991) (noting that 
one court “analyzed the legislative history of Title VII and concluded that the congressional 
objective in enacting Title VII was not to punish employers with huge damage awards”); D. Don 
Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather than 
Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 751 (1987) (“Title VII is a statute concerned not only with 
punishing individuals who intentionally engage in discriminatory acts . . . but also with the 
broad sweep of societal employment practices which produce decisions based on impermissible 
criteria.”). 
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1; see also Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Congress has armed Title VII plaintiffs with remedies designed to punish 
employers who engage in unlawful discriminatory acts, and to deter future discrimination both 
by the defendant and by all other employers.”). 
 124. See infra Part III.D (outlining the confusion in the courts over awarding punitive relief 
to employment discrimination claimants). 
 125. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 540–41 (1999). 
 126. Id. at 543. 
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where the individual perpetrating the discrimination is a manager “acting in 
the scope of employment.”127 After Kolstad, then, a key question in a typical 
employment discrimination case is whether the manager acting in an 
unlawful manner is also acting within the scope of employment.128 
Additionally, Kolstad resolves the question of whether there is a certain 
amount of egregiousness that a plaintiff must show in order to be entitled to 
exemplary relief. The Supreme Court made clear that plaintiffs were not 
required to demonstrate a particular amount of egregiousness on the part of 
the defendant to be entitled to punitive relief.129 Instead, the Court 
determined that the proper inquiry was whether the defendant 
“discriminate[d] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate 
federal law.”130 The Court explained that an employer can establish this by 
showing that the supervisor in question was acting with knowledge that she 
was violating federal law.131 More precisely, “the reprehensible character of 
the conduct is not generally considered apart from the requisite state of 
mind.”132 
Finally, the decision is important because it creates a number of 
incentives for employers to be proactive in identifying and preventing 
discrimination in the workplace. In this way, Kolstad creates an affirmative 
defense for employers that act in good faith and attempt to comply with the 
statute.133 An employer that sufficiently demonstrates its good-faith efforts at 
compliance will immunize itself from any potential liability for punitive 
damages.134 To do so, employers generally will have to establish that they 
have conducted training or implemented policies or programs targeted at 
avoiding employment discrimination.135 
The lessons from Kolstad are thus relatively simple. To be entitled to 
punitive relief, a plaintiff must first establish that the individual perpetrating 
the unlawful conduct is a manager acting within the scope of employment—
thus imputing liability to the employer.136 Next, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant knew that its actions were in violation of 
federal law (or acted recklessly in this regard).137 Finally, the defendant may 
 
 127. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 535. 
 130. Id. at 536. 
 131. Id. at 536–37. 
 132. Id. at 538. 
 133. Id. at 544–45. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 542–43 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957)) . 
 137. Id. at 533–38. 
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avoid liability for punitive damages by affirmatively demonstrating that it 
acted in good faith.138 
Though these basic principles certainly provide a significant amount of 
guidance in addressing whether an employment discrimination plaintiff is 
entitled to punitive relief, the decision still leaves questions. As already 
noted, the relief provisions of Title VII require a plaintiff to establish that 
the employer acted “with malice or with reckless indifference.”139 Perhaps 
most problematically, then, Kolstad fails to address the difficult question of 
how we specifically define what with malice or with reckless indifference really 
means. Though the principles outlined in Kolstad start us down the path of 
defining these critical terms, the parameters of this showing still remain 
largely undefined. This leaves the lower courts without any real guidance on 
how to apply the clear terms of the statute. Recent Supreme Court decisions, 
however, do provide some additional instruction for workplace litigants 
seeking punitive relief. 
C. EXXON AND PHILIP MORRIS IN THE WORKPLACE CONTEXT 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Exxon and Philip Morris arose 
well outside of the workplace arena. Nonetheless, these decisions have 
critical implications for punitive damages in the employment discrimination 
context, and offer important lessons not found in the Kolstad decision. 
Most notably, the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon provides 
important guidance on the relevance of constitutional concerns when 
awarding punitive damages pursuant to Title VII.140 In this regard, the 
Supreme Court has previously made clear—outside of the Title VII 
context—that punitive damages must generally comport with the due 
process considerations of the Constitution.141 In BMW of North America, Inc. 
v. Gore, the Court held that a “grossly excessive” punitive damages award can 
be so arbitrary as to run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.142 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court provided 
three guideposts for the courts to consider when evaluating the 
constitutional fairness of an award of punitive relief—the degree of 
reprehensibility, the disparity between the harm suffered by the plaintiff and 
the award of exemplary damages, and the difference between the punitive 
award and awards permitted in similar cases.143 
 
 138. Id. at 544. 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006). 
 140. As the implications of the Exxon decision are a bit broader than the Philip Morris case 
for workplace plaintiffs, this Article first explores the impact of the Exxon decision (despite the 
fact that Philip Morris is first in time). 
 141. See generally Markel, supra note 96, at 327–34 (discussing constitutional issues in the 
context of punitive damages). 
 142. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
 143. Id. at 574–75. 
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In addressing these guideposts, the Court placed significant emphasis 
on the ratio of the punitive damages awarded to the actual harm (or 
compensatory damages) suffered by the plaintiff in the case,144 rejecting a 
“breathtaking” award of exemplary relief that was 500 times the harm 
actually incurred by the plaintiff.145 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell, the Supreme Court provided additional guidance on the 
“guidepost” analysis and further refined the ratio inquiry set forth in Gore.146 
In this regard, the Court rejected a ratio of punitive damages to actual harm 
that was 145 to 1 and stated that it “should be obvious” that “[s]ingle-digit 
multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving 
the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with [much 
higher] ratios.”147 
The extent to which Gore and State Farm—which addressed the 
excessiveness of punitive damages under state law—would apply to federal 
claims remained an open question. What is noteworthy about the Exxon 
decision is that the case helps resolve this issue and carves out a critical 
exception for these constitutional questions where federal common law is 
involved. In Exxon, the Court considered the appropriateness of punitive 
damages awarded under maritime law and the Clean Water Act.148 
Acknowledging its prior precedent addressing the due process issues raised 
by exemplary awards, the Court dismissed those concerns in the case 
because the matter did not involve a state issue.149 Rather, the case was 
brought under federal maritime law, “which precedes and should obviate any 
application of the constitutional standard.”150 
There can be little doubt after Exxon, then, that the courts need not 
reach the due process issues raised in Gore and State Farm when addressing 
employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII. The Exxon 
Court specifically acknowledged that where federal maritime law is in place 
to address punitive relief, due process concerns are not implicated.151 Thus, 
after Exxon, employment discrimination plaintiffs should no longer need to 
 
 144. Id. at 580–83. 
 145. Id. at 582–83. 
 146. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 147. Id. at 425. 
 148. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 149. Id. at 501–02. 
 150. Id. at 502. Even before Exxon, these guideposts should not have been the focus of cases 
analyzed under federal common law. See generally TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 
U.S. 443, 465–66 (1993) (discussing the Due Process Clause and punitive damages); Donovan 
v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649–50 (1977) (discussing the role of federal courts in 
reviewing jury awards); Perez v. Z Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 625 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the role of the Constitution in federal cases). At a minimum, however, Exxon helps 
clarify that the courts need not reach the due process issues raised in Gore and State Farm when 
addressing employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII. 
 151. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 501–02. 
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address the “guideposts” set forth in Gore. The Court’s holding under federal 
maritime law is entirely consistent with Title VII case law, and it is likely that 
the Court would extend its reasoning to punitive damages awarded in the 
workplace. Indeed, two decades of decisions have helped develop a large 
body of case law establishing the parameters of these awards. Just like the 
CWA and federal maritime law, then, Title VII case law has created a federal 
scheme that satisfies any constitutional concerns over the excessiveness of 
punitive awards.152 
Beyond the case law, however, it is clear that Title VII satisfies any due 
process concerns as it specifically sets forth the limits of punitive relief, 
limiting exemplary awards based on the size of the business.153 As already 
noted, depending upon the size of the employer, a plaintiff can attain a 
combined total ranging from up to $50,000 to $300,000 in punitive and 
compensatory damages.154 Employers are on notice, then, that if they 
intentionally discriminate against employees on the basis of race, color, sex, 
national origin, or religion, they can be subjected to the punitive penalties 
set forth in the statute.155 And as the amendments to Title VII have been in 
place for two decades, there can be little doubt that employers have received 
more than sufficient notice of the employment laws and potential damages 
that flow from violating these laws, thus obviating any due process issues.156 
 
 152. This is not to say, however, that the case law addressing Title VII punitive relief is not 
without its problems. Indeed, as demonstrated in greater detail below, there is significant 
confusion over the proper standard to apply in these cases. See infra Part III.D (discussing 
confusion in lower courts). Nonetheless, the large body of case law in this area, combined with 
the statutory caps on exemplary relief, provide a significant amount of notice to employers of 
the punitive damages they can be subjected to if they run afoul of the statute. 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
583 (1996) (“[A] reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of punitive 
damages is excessive should ‘accord substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning 
appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.’” (quoting Browning–Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part))); Perez, 223 F.3d at 625 (“[W]hen a plaintiff seeks punitive damages in a 
federal case, it is unnecessary to look for limits in the Constitution.”). 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)–(D). Another federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, contains no statutory cap for punitive damages. See infra Part V (discussing limitations of 
the model proposed in this Article). While beyond the scope of this Article, an important issue 
remaining after Exxon is the extent to which that decision would apply to claims brought under 
42 U.S.C. § 1981. See infra Part V (same). 
 155. See, e.g., Abner v. Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 164 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
combination of the statutory cap and high threshold of culpability for any [Title VII] award 
confines the amount of the award to a level tolerated by due process.”); Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 
233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing reasonableness of punitive damages awards that 
fall within the Title VII statutory limits). 
 156. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 
1999) (“The reasonableness of the punitive award is buttressed by the fact that the 
[employment discrimination] statute [the defendant] was found to have violated caps punitive 
awards . . . . The award in this case falls within the range that Congress has determined to be 
reasonable . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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Thus, where a “congressionally-mandated, statutory scheme” sets forth the 
clear financial implications for intentionally violating federal law, any award 
within the confines of that scheme “provides strong evidence that a 
defendant’s due process rights have not been violated.”157 
Additionally, given even the upper limits of the potential punitive 
awards—which have remained static since the amendments went into 
effect—there is no need for employers to be concerned with the 
multimillion-dollar verdicts that have arisen in other contexts, excluding 
those workplace cases arising as part of class-action litigation. The federal 
case law of Title VII, then, combined with the punitive damages limits of the 
statute, work together to assure that “a penalty [is] reasonably predictable in 
its severity,” and is not “eccentrically high.”158 Certainly, Title VII punitive 
awards must still be reviewed by the federal courts, but it is now clear that 
due process concerns should no longer be the focus of the courts’ 
analyses.159 
Similarly, the inquiry into the ratio between actual harm to punitive 
damages—which formed part of the Supreme Court’s due process analysis 
in Gore—now seems largely irrelevant to workplace claims for due process 
purposes.160 However, the degree of actual harm may still prove important as 
 
 157. Romano, 233 F.3d at 673. This is not to say that any federal statute would necessarily 
pass constitutional muster, and one could certainly hypothesize a federal law that would 
encounter due process problems. However, given that the Title VII punitive limits are 
reasonable and have remained unchanged over the last twenty years, it seems likely that the 
statute complies with the constitutional requirements. 
 158. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008); see also Abner, 513 F.3d at 164 
(“Given that Congress has effectively set the tolerable proportion [for Title VII claims], the 
three-factor Gore analysis is relevant only if the statutory cap itself offends due process. It does 
not and, as we have found in punitive damages cases with accompanying nominal damages, a 
ratio-based inquiry becomes irrelevant.”). 
 159. See generally Perez v. Z Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 625 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“Federal judges may, and should, insist that the award be sensible and justified by a sound 
theory of deterrence. Random and freakish punitive awards have no place in federal court, and 
intellectual discipline should be maintained. If the award is well justified, then it is also 
constitutionally sound . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 160. See, e.g., Abner, 513 F.3d 154 at 164 (discussing relevance of Gore factors to Title VII 
cases). Nonetheless, it could be argued after Exxon that the ratio of punitive to actual damages 
is still a critical inquiry. Indeed, in Exxon the Court concluded that a 1:1 ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages “is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.” 554 U.S. at 513. In 
employment discrimination cases, however, Congress has clearly set a reasonable upper limit of 
punitive damages that can be imposed on the largest employers. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(b)(3)(D). The statute is thus clear that Congress intended for employers that run 
afoul of the provisions to potentially be subjected to these upper punitive limits—irrespective of 
the ratio to actual harm. Id. Though, as already noted, any award of punitive relief can be 
reviewed by the federal courts for excessiveness, and the actual harm involved in a case is 
certainly one place the court should look as part of this determination. Cf. Pickett v. Sheridan 
Health Care Ctr., 610 F.3d 434, 447 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A]ppellant asks us to extend [Exxon] to 
mandate a one-to-one ratio between compensatory and punitive damages in this case. The logic 
of [Exxon] does not apply to this Title VII case.”). 
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part of the consideration of the overall appropriateness of a punitive award, 
although this determination will likely take place outside of the due process 
context.161 
In addition to the critical importance of Exxon to employment 
discrimination plaintiffs, the Supreme Court’s decision in Philip Morris has 
significant implications for workplace litigants. In particular, Philip Morris 
provides important guidance to Title VII plaintiffs on the importance of 
harm an employer might cause to third parties when it intentionally 
discriminates against an individual on the basis of a protected 
characteristic.162 Though a somewhat complex case, the holding of Philip 
Morris is straightforward: a jury may consider harm incurred by strangers to 
the litigation for purposes of considering reprehensibility—but not 
punishment—when awarding punitive damages.163 
To the extent the case is applicable to a federal statute (an issue 
discussed in more detail below), the decision clarifies that employment 
discrimination plaintiffs may not argue for enhanced exemplary relief to 
punish an employer for similar harms it caused other individuals in the 
workplace. Thus, for example, where an employer discriminates against 
three workers on the basis of race and only one employee files a claim, 
punitive damages cannot be used to punish the employer on behalf of those 
who did not bring an action. Just like the defendant in Philip Morris, an 
employer in this situation will be unable to properly defend itself where the 
accusations of injury come from “strangers to the litigation.”164 
Nonetheless, the employer’s conduct toward nonparties to the litigation 
may still be addressed when the jury considers the reprehensible nature of 
the conduct when awarding punitive relief.165 In Philip Morris, the Court did 
acknowledge that a jury may consider reprehensibility when awarding punitive 
damages and that nonparty harm may factor into that determination.166 
 
 161. Some federal courts have even approved “infinite” ratios of punitive damages to actual 
harm in the employment discrimination context. See Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 
352, 357 (2d Cir. 2001) (“An award of actual or nominal damages is not a prerequisite for an 
award of punitive damages in Title VII cases.”); Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 
F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (“No reason comes to mind for reading a compensatory-
punitive link into § 1981a or Title VII . . . .”). But see Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 
1205, 1215 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[T]he punitive damages award must be vacated absent either a 
compensatory damages award, or a timely request for nominal damages, on the federal 
claims.”). See generally Abner, 513 F.3d at 159–60 (discussing various appellate court approaches 
to issue of whether actual damages are necessary for an award of exemplary relief in a Title VII 
case); Azimi v. Jordan’s Meats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228, 237–38 (1st Cir. 2006) (same); Levi, supra 
note 13 (same). 
 162. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 163. Id. at 354–55. See generally Markel, supra note 96, at 327–34 (discussing constitutional 
issues in the context of punitive damages). 
 164. Phillip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353–54. 
 165. Id. at 354–55. 
 166. Id. 
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Thus, to the extent that an employer’s conduct harms several individuals in 
the workplace, a jury may award greater punitive relief to a single individual 
bringing a claim if it finds the conduct particularly reprehensible.167 This 
distinction—that a plaintiff may be awarded punitive relief for harm caused 
to nonparties on the basis of reprehensibility, but not punishment—may 
prove critical at the conclusion of Title VII litigation.168 
Indeed, the issue of third-party harm will have broad implications in the 
employment discrimination context. An employer that discriminates against 
one individual may often discriminate against others as well.169 And victims 
of employment discrimination are particularly hesitant to bring claims for 
fear of retaliation, disruption of the workplace environment, or concern 
over the perception of their coworkers.170 Thus, it would not be unusual for 
an employer that maintains a workplace permeated with discrimination to 
be sued by only one or two individuals.171 After Philip Morris, a strong 
argument can be made that these individuals will be unable to use the 
discriminatory experiences of their coworkers to further punish the 
employer.172 These individuals would be left to couch the experiences of 
their coworkers in terms of the reprehensible nature of the employer’s 
conduct.173 
Of course, a strong argument can be made that Philip Morris is 
inapplicable to employment discrimination cases and that the decision is 
easily distinguishable from traditional workplace claims. The case arose as a 
question of state law, and the Court addressed whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution prohibits a state from punishing a defendant for 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. It should be noted that in Kolstad, the Court downplayed the importance of 
considering reprehensibility when awarding punitive relief for workplace claims, stating that 
“the reprehensible character of the conduct is not generally considered apart from the requisite 
state of mind.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999). Thus, the 
reprehensibility question in employment discrimination cases will often be considered as part 
of the mental state of the employer. Id. 
 169. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 200–03 (2010) 
(discussing studies on employment discrimination that show its continued prevalence). 
 170. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
583, 587–88 (“Prospective Title VII plaintiffs worry about retaliation, particularly if they are still 
employed by the defendant, and worry about being labeled ‘troublemakers.’”); Brianne J. 
Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1469, 1478 (2007) (“That a reluctance to report Title VII violations persists is a serious 
problem because Title VII’s ability to realize its potential depends, more so than with much 
other federal legislation, on the willingness of victims of workplace discrimination to bring that 
discrimination to light.”). 
 171. See generally Judith J. Johnson, Rebuilding the Barriers: The Trend in Employment 
Discrimination Class Actions, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 54 (1987) (arguing that in the 
employment discrimination class action context, courts “should take into account that fear of 
retaliation will prevent the vast majority of employees from joining a suit”). 
 172. Phillip Morris, 549 U.S. at 354–55. 
 173. Id. 
A3 - SEINER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:52 PM 
496 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:473 
nonparty harm.174 The Court’s holding is thus premised on the notion that 
due process requires that an individual cannot be punished without having 
the opportunity to present a full defense—which it is unable to do where it 
is being accused of harm by nonlitigants.175 Just like Exxon, then, Philip 
Morris addresses the due process concerns of a punitive damages award 
issued under state law.176 A defendant facing an employment discrimination 
claim under Title VII, however, may not have these same due process 
arguments. Indeed, as discussed above, Title VII defendants have full 
knowledge of the amount of punitive relief they can be subjected to under 
the federal statute and case law.177 And these amounts are relatively low, and 
do not reflect the type of “runaway” jury awards that the Court may have 
been attempting to address in its recent cases.178 It may well be, then, that 
the primary holding of Philip Morris is inapplicable to Title VII claims, and 
future litigation may help resolve this issue. Nonetheless, even if the holding 
itself does not apply in the workplace context, the federal courts are still free 
to use the tenor of the decision when reviewing punitive damages awards. 
Certainly, in determining whether a jury’s award of exemplary relief is 
excessive, the federal courts could consider whether punishing an employer 
for harm to third parties is fair and equitable under the particular 
circumstances of the case. At a minimum, then, Philip Morris provides 
substantial guidance to the litigants and courts on the potential impact of 
nonparty harm in the employment discrimination context. Future litigation 
may well provide the exact contours for how that guidance will be applied to 
workplace plaintiffs. 
D. CONFUSION IN THE COURTS 
Not surprisingly, the lack of clear guidance on the applicable standard 
for awarding punitive damages in the employment discrimination context 
has resulted in conflicting and confused decisions in the lower courts. The 
extent to which the recent Supreme Court holdings apply in the 
employment discrimination context is still unclear.179 The Title VII statutory 
standard for punitive relief provides that an employer must take an unlawful 
action “with malice or with reckless indifference,”180 but this standard can—
and has been—interpreted by the courts in a variety of ways. Though Kolstad 
 
 174. Id. at 353. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Compare Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), with Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 
346. 
 177. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006) (setting forth potential punitive damages awards in Title 
VII cases). 
 178. See Exxon, 554 U.S. 471; Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 346. Of course, successful class action 
employment discrimination litigation may result in substantial punitive awards. 
 179. See Exxon, 554 U.S. 471; Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 346. 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). 
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provided some direction for employment discrimination litigants, the 
decision failed to offer clear guidance on how the malice or reckless 
indifference standard should be applied.181 The confusion over this 
standard, as well as how to analyze workplace punitive damages claims more 
generally, has resulted in varied opinions in the federal courts. 
EEOC v. Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Associates provides an 
excellent recent example of the lower courts’ confusion on the question of 
exemplary relief.182 In that case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered whether the district court had improperly failed to instruct the 
jury on punitive damages in a pregnancy discrimination case that was 
brought pursuant to Title VII.183 A receptionist in the case worked for a 
medical clinic and informed the partnership shortly after being hired that 
she was pregnant and would eventually need about six to eight weeks of 
leave as a result.184 After the managing partner found out about the 
pregnancy, he stated in a meeting that “[i]t doesn’t make any sense to begin 
training her . . . . [W]e are going to have to let her go.”185 She was 
terminated shortly thereafter and was told that “your baby is going to be due 
during our busy season” and that the partnership would not have hired her 
“if [it] had known she was pregnant.”186 A supervisor subsequently told 
another candidate for the vacant position it was “a problem” that she was four 
months pregnant and that she should “just continue her pregnancy, have 
the baby, have her maternity leave,” and then the partnership would 
consider her.187 This same supervisor wrote on the top of the applicant’s 
resume that she was “4 months pregnant!”188 
The EEOC subsequently filed suit, alleging that the partnership had 
terminated the receptionist and failed to hire the subsequent applicant on 
the basis of pregnancy—a clear violation of Title VII.189 The district court 
allowed the case to go to the jury, but granted the defendant judgment as a 
matter of law on the issue of whether punitive damages were available in the 
matter.190 The district court determined that “it has not been shown that 
there was a perceived risk that the actions [of the defendant] would violate 
federal law to be liable on punitive damages.”191 Following a trial, the jury 
 
 181. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 
780 (discussing “malice or reckless indifference”). 
 182. EEOC v. Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Assocs., 578 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 183. Id. at 923. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 186. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 187. Id. at 924 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 188. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 925 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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concluded that the partnership had discriminated on the basis of pregnancy 
and awarded $15,341 in backpay to the receptionist and $5,757 in backpay 
to the subsequent applicant for the position.192 The EEOC appealed on the 
punitive damages question.193 
In considering the issue, the Eighth Circuit summarized the guidance 
provided by Kolstad on the question of exemplary relief for Title VII 
claims.194 The court concluded that the managing partner that had fired the 
receptionist had been warned that he should not do so on the basis of her 
pregnancy.195 Similarly, the supervisor that rejected the subsequent 
applicant for the position had testified that she was aware that pregnancy 
discrimination was unlawful.196 Given that both decisions were made by 
individuals with supervisory authority and that both individuals were aware 
that their conduct was illegal, the court concluded that a punitive damages 
instruction should have been given to the jury.197 The court thus determined 
that the conduct of those involved could properly be imputed to the 
partnership itself and that the district court erred in failing to give the 
punitive damages instruction.198 The court therefore remanded for a new 
trial solely on the question of exemplary relief.199 
This decision provides an excellent illustration of the existing confusion 
over when punitive damages are appropriate under Title VII. The district 
court in this case refused to give the question to the jury because it believed 
that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the employer’s 
conduct was performed under “a perceived risk” of “violat[ing] federal 
law.”200 The Eighth Circuit properly recognized, however, that there was 
sufficient evidence that those involved in the unlawful conduct had 
supervisory or managerial authority and that they were aware that their 
conduct might violate pregnancy discrimination law.201 Though the 
appellate court likely got it right in the end, it is disturbing that the federal 
courts can so plainly disagree on the appropriate standard for sending a 
punitive damages question to the jury and that the courts can view the same 
evidence so differently. The unfortunate result in this case is that the 
question of exemplary relief must be remanded for a new trial, resulting in 
substantial inefficiencies for both the courts and litigants. 
 
 192. Id. at 924. 
 193. Id. at 925. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 925–26. 
 196. Id. at 926. 
 197. Id. at 925–27. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 927. 
 200. Id. at 925. 
 201. Id. at 925–27. 
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Unfortunately, this case is not isolated in its confusion over this issue, 
and the lower courts routinely grapple with the proper standard to apply to 
workplace punitive damages claims.202 It is not uncommon for the appellate 
courts to reverse the district courts on the question of exemplary relief, 
particularly in employment discrimination cases. For example, in EEOC v. 
Heartway Corp., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s 
decision not to give a punitive damages instruction in a disability case and 
remanded for a new trial on that issue.203 In that case, a nursing-home 
employee with hepatitis was terminated by the facility administrator after he 
found out about her condition, despite the fact that the administrator was 
aware “that it was against the law to fire someone because they had a 
disability.”204 Finding that the administrator’s unlawful conduct and 
knowledge of the law could be imputed to the company, the appellate court 
reversed for a new trial on punitive damages.205 Similarly, in EEOC v. Stocks, 
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the district 
court had erred in failing to give a punitive damages instruction to the jury 
in an employment discrimination case.206 Again, there was evidence in that 
case that showed that the unlawful acts “were taken by management-level 
employees acting within the scope of their employment” and that the 
“decisionmakers were aware of their responsibilities under title VII.”207 
As a final example, in Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Group, Inc., 
the Eighth Circuit reached a completely different result from those 
decisions discussed previously, vacating a district court’s award of exemplary 
relief in an employment discrimination case.208 In Canny, a jury awarded 
$100,000 in punitive damages to a beverage company’s former route 
supervisor who was terminated after he was diagnosed with a degenerative 
eye condition and could no longer maintain a driver’s license.209 The 
appellate court was persuaded that the employer did not reassign the 
plaintiff to an available warehouse position because of genuine safety 
 
 202. See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 767–72 (discussing application of punitive 
damages standard to workplace cases by federal courts). 
 203. EEOC v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006). The damages 
provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act adopts the punitive damages standard set forth 
in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (2006). The author served as lead counsel in the Heartway 
case (and the Stocks, Inc. case, infra notes 206–07 and accompanying text) on behalf of the 
EEOC. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not represent the 
views of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or of the United States. 
 204. Heartway, 466 F.3d at 1159–60, 1169. 
 205. Id. at 1168–71. 
 206. EEOC v. Stocks, Inc., 228 F. App’x 429, 432–33 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 207. Id. at 431–32. Interestingly, unlike the courts in Siouxland and Heartway, the Fifth 
Circuit refused to order a trial solely on the issue of punitive damages. Id. at 432–33. Instead, 
the court left to the plaintiff “the choice of whether it wants a new trial on all issues, or wishes 
instead to retain its judgment [issued by the first jury].” Id. at 433. 
 208. Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 905 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 209. Id. at 899. 
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concerns that the company maintained, and it therefore did not act 
maliciously.210 Because the employer reasonably believed that it was “caught” 
between OSHA safety regulations and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
the company “made a culpable, but not malicious or reckless, decision based 
upon safety concerns.”211 The court thus vacated the punitive damages 
award.212 
As this sampling of cases demonstrates, there is a significant amount of 
confusion over when punitive damages are appropriate in employment 
discrimination matters. This confusion seems largely caused by the 
ambiguous standard of “malice or . . . reckless indifference” set forth in the 
statute,213 as well as the lack of clear guidance on how to analyze these cases 
more generally. It is almost impossible to know how widespread this 
problem is, as many litigants may even choose not to appeal an adverse 
determination on exemplary relief, particularly where they have prevailed in 
other aspects of the case.214 Nonetheless, these cases sufficiently demonstrate 
the extreme difficulty that the lower courts face when applying the Title VII 
punitive damages standard. Though Kolstad was helpful in that it provided a 
basic framework from which the courts could consider whether to award 
punitive relief, the decision failed to go far enough in defining when 
exemplary damages are appropriate. The consequence of the Supreme 
Court’s failure in Kolstad is the current confusion in the lower courts, as 
clearly seen in the cases discussed above. 
IV. A NEW MODEL 
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on interpreting the 
statutory standard for exemplary relief in Title VII cases. Now that Kolstad is 
over a decade old, it is time to reassess the guidance we have been given and 
identify those remaining areas of the law that still require clarity. A new 
model for awarding punitive relief in employment discrimination cases is 
needed to simplify this area of the law and to provide a blueprint for the 
litigants and courts when assessing whether exemplary relief is appropriate. 
The confusion that currently exists in the law has resulted in conflicting 
opinions in the federal courts and significant inefficiencies for the judicial 
system. This Article seeks to put an end to this confusion by providing an 
 
 210. Id. at 903–04. 
 211. Id. at 903 (emphasis added). 
 212. Id. at 905. 
 213. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006). See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 767–72 
(discussing application of punitive damages standard to workplace cases by federal courts). 
 214. On the other hand, the plaintiffs in Siouxland, Heartway, and Stocks, Inc. all prevailed to 
some degree in their respective cases at the district-court level but still chose to appeal the 
adverse determination on punitive damages. See generally EEOC v. Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial 
Surgery Assocs., 578 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Stocks, Inc., 228 F. App’x 429 (5th Cir. 
2007); EEOC v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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analytical framework for evaluating whether exemplary relief is appropriate 
for a given workplace claim.215 In developing this analytical model, we must 
first briefly reassess what we have learned from Kolstad and the subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions on punitive relief. Though these cases lack clarity 
for employment discrimination litigants, the decisions do provide a baseline 
from which we can begin analyzing Title VII claims. 
Initially, from Kolstad, we learned that when awarding punitive relief we 
must look to agency principles to impute the unlawful conduct of a 
supervisor or manager to the employer.216 And, as outlined above, Exxon 
makes clear that the courts need not reach the due process issues raised in 
Gore and State Farm when addressing employment discrimination claims 
brought under Title VII.217 Finally, after Philip Morris, we know that it may be 
difficult for victims of employment discrimination to use the discriminatory 
experiences of their coworkers to further punish the employer, though 
these experiences can still be used to show the reprehensible nature of the 
employer’s conduct.218 
With these principles from Kolstad, Exxon, and Philip Morris in mind, 
then, this Article proposes a five-part analytical framework for analyzing 
whether punitive damages are appropriate for a Title VII claim. Navigating 
these Supreme Court decisions and keeping in mind the goals of exemplary 
relief, the proposed framework will serve as a blueprint for litigants and 
courts to evaluate punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. 
And, perhaps most important, this model will help resolve the question of 
what evidence is necessary to establish that an employer has acted with 
malice or reckless indifference—a standard that has confused and plagued 
the lower courts for years.219 It is worth noting that this framework focuses 
 
 215. I have previously argued for replacing the punitive damages scheme of Title VII with a 
more streamlined liquidated damages approach, similar to that used in age discrimination 
cases. See generally Seiner, supra note 4. This Article takes a different approach by addressing the 
following question: If exemplary relief continues to be part of the Title VII analysis, what is the 
best way to analyze these claims? 
 216. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). In this regard, the supervisor must 
have acted within the scope of the supervisor’s employment and with the knowledge that the 
acts violated federal law (or with reckless disregard of the law). Id. 
 217. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). The Exxon Court specifically 
acknowledged that where federal common law addresses punitive relief, due process concerns 
are not implicated, id., and Title VII itself provides a reasonable upper limit for potential 
punitive relief, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). 
 218. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). As noted earlier, however, there 
is still some question as to the extent to which the holding of Philip Morris will ultimately apply 
to Title VII claims. See supra Part III.C. 
 219. See supra Part III.D (outlining the confusion in the courts over awarding punitive relief 
to employment discrimination claimants). Some courts have articulated tests for analyzing 
punitive damages under Kolstad. See, e.g., Davey v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 301 F.3d 1204, 
1208–09 (10th Cir. 2002) (setting forth test); Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 
857–58 (7th Cir. 2001) (same). 
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exclusively on punitive damages in Title VII cases and does not explore the 
question of exemplary relief under other civil rights statutes, such as 42 
U.S.C. § 1981.220 Where the proposed model mentions employment 
discrimination or workplace plaintiffs, then, it is specifically referencing 
those individuals bringing claims pursuant to Title VII. 
Thus, the following five elements should be evaluated at the close of 
trial to determine whether a punitive damages instruction should be given to 
the jury in a case of intentional discrimination brought under Title VII. 
A. MANAGEMENT-LEVEL EMPLOYEE 
When evaluating whether there is sufficient evidence to award punitive 
damages in an employment discrimination case, the first inquiry is whether a 
supervisor or manager is responsible for the unlawful conduct. If a 
supervisor or manager is involved, the inquiry is satisfied and we can move 
on to the other aspects of the analytical framework. If a supervisor or 
manager is not involved in the conduct, the inquiry is over, and punitive 
damages are not warranted in the case.221 Though the question seems 
relatively straightforward, determining which employees have sufficient 
supervisory authority to impute liability to the employer is not always easy. 
As we learned from Kolstad, we must rely on the principles of agency 
when attempting to impute malicious or reckless conduct to the 
employer.222 And Kolstad makes clear that liability can be imputed where the 
employer “authorizes or ratifies the agent’s tortious act,”223 or where the 
individual perpetrating the discrimination is a manager “acting in the scope 
of employment.”224 To determine whether an employee is a supervisor, the 
courts should examine the authority that the individual is given and “the 
amount of discretion that the employee has in what is done and how it is 
accomplished.”225 Midlevel managers would satisfy the Court’s standard (as 
adopted from the Restatement), as the individual “must be ‘important,’ but 
perhaps need not be the employer’s ‘top management, officers, or 
directors,’ to be acting ‘in a managerial capacity.’”226 Knowing that midlevel 
managers or supervisors are sufficient to impute liability to the employer for 
punitive damages is helpful, but it still leaves a significant amount of 
 
 220. See infra Part V (discussing limitations of the model proposed in this Article). 
 221. As discussed below, there may be an exception to this rule for instances where the 
employer knew or should have known of the conduct of a nonsupervisor but failed to act. This 
possible exception would apply largely to instances of coworker harassment. 
 222. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 539–46 (1999). 
 223. Id. at 543 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957)). 
 224. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 225. Id. (quoting SCHLEUTER & REDDEN, supra note 43, § 4.4(B)(2)(a), at 181) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 226. Id. (quoting SCHLEUTER & REDDEN, supra note 43, § 4.4(B)(2)(a), at 181). 
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ambiguity as to which employees satisfy this standard. Even Kolstad 
acknowledges that “no good definition of what constitutes . . . ‘managerial 
capacity’ has been found.”227 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided no additional guidance 
on who is a supervisor for purposes of imputing punitive damages liability to 
the employer in a Title VII case. In the sexual-harassment context, the Court 
has advised that a supervisor is someone with the authority to take a tangible 
employment action, which includes hiring, firing, not promoting, or 
reassigning an employee with significantly different job duties.228 In this 
context, a supervisor is someone “with immediate (or successively higher) 
authority over the [plaintiff].”229 For additional guidance, we must look to 
the law of the individual circuits where the suit is filed to determine if the 
employee perpetrating the unlawful conduct is a management employee. 
And, not surprisingly, the lower courts have taken varying approaches on 
this issue.230 Thus, for example, some courts hold that the ability to merely 
recommend a tangible employment action is sufficient for a worker to have 
managerial status.231 
At a minimum, however, if the employee has the requisite authority to 
take a tangible employment action, that employee will almost certainly be 
 
 227. Id. (quoting 2 JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 24.05, at 14 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 228. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (“A tangible employment 
action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.”); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 
(1998) (“[T]here is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims against employers for 
discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing, promotion, 
compensation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer liability once the 
discrimination was shown.”). 
 229. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 230. See generally Stephanie Ann Henning Blackman, Note, The Faragher and Ellerth 
Problem: Lower Courts’ Confusion Regarding the Definition of “Supervisor,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 123, 163 
(2001) (“Because the Supreme Court did not intend to overrule the traditional ‘hiring, firing, 
or conditions of employment’ definition of supervisor, most courts have correctly continued to 
apply this definition. Other courts have utilized the expansive language of Faragher and Ellerth.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 231. See id. (discussing supervisor status); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241 
(10th Cir. 1999) (addressing whether an individual was a supervisor under the ADA for 
purposes of exemplary relief). But see Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 
1034 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that supervisory employees have authority to “hire, fire, demote, 
promote, transfer, or discipline an employee” and that without “an entrustment of at least some 
of this authority, an employee does not qualify as a supervisor for purposes [of] imputing 
liability to the employer”); cf. West v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 374 F. App’x 624, 639 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(“Given that [the specified individual] was listed as a proper contact under [defendant’s] 
policy, the district court cannot be said to have committed plain error in concluding that there 
was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that [the individual] was a managerial employee for 
purposes of awarding punitive damages.” (footnote omitted)). 
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considered a supervisor for purposes of Title VII.232 This general guideline 
will help litigants determine whether the bad actor involved is a managerial 
agent of the company, though the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case will make it difficult to anticipate every situation that may arise. In sum, 
if the individual in question can hire, fire, promote, or transfer, then that 
employee will likely fall within the parameters of possessing managerial 
authority.233 If not, then there is a strong possibility that the individual is not 
a manager, though additional inquiry into the particular law of the 
jurisdiction may yield a more definitive answer.234 
One special circumstance to consider is the potential for punitive 
damages where coworkers are responsible for the illegal conduct—a situation 
likely to arise in the harassment context. The Supreme Court has made clear 
that an employer may be held liable for discrimination under Title VII 
where that employer knew or should have known that coworker harassment 
was present in the workplace but failed to take appropriate remedial 
action.235 In this context, however, liability for punitive damages is less clear, 
as the individual perpetrating the unlawful conduct is a coworker (rather 
than a managerial employee, which Kolstad seems to require). Nonetheless, 
Kolstad does acknowledge that liability for punitive damages may be imputed 
where the employer “authorizes or ratifies the agent’s tortious act.”236 It thus 
seems a fair inference that if a manager ratifies the harassing (or otherwise 
unlawful) conduct of the victim’s coworker, the first prong of the analytical 
framework will be satisfied, as a supervisor is ultimately endorsing the 
discrimination.237 While there can be little doubt that something beyond 
mere negligence will be required to hold the employer liable for punitive 
 
 232. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542–43; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790. The 
EEOC has also defined who is a manager in the sexual-harassment context, noting that a 
supervisor is someone who “has authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment 
decisions affecting the employee” or someone who “has authority to direct the employee’s daily 
work activities.” EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR 
UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999), available at http:// 
archive.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html. 
 233. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790. See generally Blackman, supra note 
230, at 145–46 (“Even though the [Supreme] Court did not expressly adopt the ‘hiring, firing, 
or conditions of employment’ definition, it seemingly advocated this type of inquiry when 
determining supervisory status.”). 
 234. See generally Blackman, supra note 230 (looking at various federal court interpretations 
of who constitutes a supervisor in employment discrimination cases). 
 235. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759 (“An employer is negligent with respect to sexual 
harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.”). 
 236. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957)). 
 237. See David D. Powell, Jr. & Catherine C. Crane, Complying with the Mandate of Kolstad: Are 
Your Good Faith Efforts Enough?, 36 TULSA L.J. 591, 593 (2001) (discussing Baty v. Willamette 
Indus., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999), and stating that the Tenth Circuit held that “the 
plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages upon a showing that the employer failed to make 
good faith efforts to investigate and respond to her complaints, and that high-level 
management was aware of and implicitly condoned the offending conduct [of coworkers]”). 
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relief in the coworker discrimination context, the contours of this issue are 
still developing in the lower courts. 
In summary, to satisfy the first prong of the proposed framework, a 
supervisor with authority to effectuate a tangible employment action must be 
involved in the unlawful conduct. If a supervisor is involved but is merely 
endorsing the discriminatory acts of a coworker or if the supervisor involved 
has only limited authority to act, the specific facts of the case and law of the 
jurisdiction must be looked at more closely. 
B. MANAGER HAD KNOWLEDGE OF TITLE VII 
“[A]n employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk 
that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages” 
under Title VII.238 To satisfy the second prong of the analytical framework, 
the plaintiff is required to produce sufficient evidence to establish that the 
employer had knowledge that its actions were in violation of Title VII.239 
This inquiry can be a bit tricky, as uncovering an employer’s knowledge of 
federal law is not always an easy task. 
Unfortunately, there is no exhaustive list of ways to establish an 
employer’s knowledge of the statute. One common way of establishing a 
supervisor’s knowledge of Title VII, however, is through testimony at trial or 
during a deposition.240 Indeed, in an effort to avoid the underlying liability 
for allegations pertaining to discrimination, company officials may be 
particularly willing to acknowledge that they are well aware of federal 
employment discrimination law and indicate that their conduct was entirely 
consistent with these laws.241 Simply asking whether the supervisor in 
 
 238. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536. 
 239. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 335 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n employer 
that is unaware of the relevant federal prohibition or that acts with a justifiable belief that its 
discrimination is lawful will not be liable for punitive damages.”); West v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 374 
F. App’x 624, 638 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In general, courts have found this element met where the 
plaintiff shows the supervisors involved in the decision at issue had anti-discrimination training 
or even very general knowledge about anti-discrimination laws or an employer’s anti-
discrimination policies.” (quoting Sackett v. ITC^Deltacom, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 602, 612 
(E.D. Tenn. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 
F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing whether store manager had sufficient knowledge 
of the ADA for purposes of awarding exemplary relief); Bruso v. United Airlines Inc., 239 F.3d 
848, 857 (7th Cir. 2001) (“To be entitled to punitive damages, a plaintiff must first 
demonstrate that the employer acted with the requisite mental state.”). 
 240. See EEOC v. Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Assocs., 578 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 
2009) (holding that the evidence “was sufficient to submit the question of punitive damages to 
the jury” where a supervisor involved in the unlawful conduct “testified that she knew that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was illegal”). 
 241. See EEOC v. Stocks, Inc., 228 F. App’x 429, 431–32 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The owner . . . 
testified that he did not discipline the plaintiff after her initial complaints, because she would 
have gone ‘to the EEOC.’ In several of our sister circuits, evidence that the employer has 
knowledge of the anti-discrimination laws alone is sufficient to demonstrate reckless 
indifference and allow punitive damages to be submitted to the jury.”). 
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question has knowledge of Title VII is likely the easiest way for a plaintiff to 
establish an employer’s familiarity with employment discrimination law. 
Similarly, a plaintiff can establish the requisite mental state by showing 
that the employer has conducted training on employment discrimination 
law that the supervisor(s) in question attended.242 Or the victim can show 
that the company maintained an explicit policy prohibiting discrimination 
covered by Title VII of which the supervisor was aware.243 Finally, another 
common way of showing the requisite mental state is through the employer’s 
deception. If company workers “lied, either to the plaintiff or to the jury, in 
order to cover up their discriminatory actions,” this evidence would go 
directly to the employer’s knowledge that its conduct was unlawful.244 And in 
some respects, the sheer fact that Title VII has been in place for nearly half a 
century will make it difficult for managers to deny their familiarity with its 
operative provisions.245 Given the history and widespread nature of federal 
employment discrimination law, then, some courts might even be willing to 
presume that managers (particularly at large corporations) are aware of 
Title VII’s provisions, 246 though plaintiffs should not rely solely on this 
presumption. 
The knowledge requirement is likely the most difficult element of the 
analytical framework for the plaintiff to establish. Indeed, there are a 
number of readily available explanations for an employer’s discriminatory 
conduct that often have nothing to do with a desire to intentionally violate 
 
 242. See, e.g., EEOC v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156, 1169 (10th Cir. 2006) (manager 
involved in unlawful conduct concedes at trial that on the basis of training received he was 
aware “that it was against the law to fire someone because they had a disability”); Zimmermann 
v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing whether 
antidiscrimination training is sufficient to impute knowledge of federal law); Lowery v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 443 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Monteagudo v. Asociación 
de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 554 F.3d 164, 176–77 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting 
importance of training for good-faith defense). 
 243. See, e.g., West, 374 F. App’x at 638 (discussing mangers’ knowledge of company’s 
antiharassment policy); Bruso, 239 F.3d at 857–58 (noting importance of knowledge of 
company antidiscrimination policy for purposes of awarding punitive damages); Ogden v. Wax 
Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting importance of manager’s knowledge 
of sexual-harassment policy for purposes of exemplary relief). 
 244. Bruso, 239 F.3d at 858 (citing Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 
212 F.3d 493, 516 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 245. See generally DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The extent 
of federal statutory and constitutional law preventing discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or 
race suggests that defendants had to know that such discrimination was illegal . . . .”); 
Zimmermann, 251 F.3d at 385 (citing DiMarco-Zappa, 238 F.3d at 38, and Molnar v. Booth, 229 
F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2000), and noting that “some courts have ruled” that “all managers are now 
chargeable with knowledge of Title VII’s clear requirements”); Molnar, 229 F.3d at 604 
(upholding punitive damages award and emphasizing that “[t]he events here took place in 
1994, long after the law of sexual harassment had become well established by the Supreme 
Court”). 
 246. See supra note 245. 
A3 - SEINER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:52 PM 
2012] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 507 
federal law.247 Some of the most common explanations for why an employer 
might run afoul of Title VII—without acting with malice or reckless 
disregard—were set forth by the Supreme Court in Kolstad, and include 
cases where 
the employer may simply be unaware of the relevant federal 
prohibition. There will be cases, moreover, in which the employer 
discriminates with the distinct belief that its discrimination is 
lawful. The underlying theory of discrimination may be novel or 
otherwise poorly recognized, or an employer may reasonably 
believe that its discrimination satisfies a bona fide occupational 
qualification defense or other statutory exception to liability.248 
Thus, an employer does not act with the requisite mental state to 
warrant punitive damages where that employer is not aware of Title VII, 
where the employer believes its discriminatory conduct is lawful, where the 
basis for liability is new or undeveloped, or where the employer reasonably 
believes its conduct falls within a statutory exception.249 Certainly, we must 
look to the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine if one 
of these explanations adequately applies, keeping in mind that it is the 
plaintiff’s ultimate burden in the matter to establish liability for punitive 
relief.250 
Nonetheless, simply asking during a deposition or at trial whether those 
involved in the unlawful conduct were aware of, or had training on, Title VII 
may often yield the evidence necessary to establish the second prong of the 
proposed analytical framework. And, as discussed above, there are a variety 
of other ways to go about establishing an employer’s knowledge of Title VII’s 
provisions. Finally, it is worth noting that there are likely additional ways—
beyond simply demonstrating an employer’s familiarity with the statute—to 
establish that a company discriminated “in the face of a perceived risk that 
its actions will violate federal law.”251 Establishing knowledge of Title VII, 
however, is the most common way of demonstrating the requisite mental 
state of the employer.252 
 
 247. See, e.g., Andrew Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 
82 IND. L.J. 411, 438 n.90 (2007) (noting circumstances the Kolstad Court identified where 
intentional discrimination would not subject the employer to exemplary damages). 
 248. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536–37 (1999). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. at 546 (“We have concluded that an employer’s conduct need not be 
independently ‘egregious’ to satisfy § 1981a’s requirements for a punitive damages award, 
although evidence of egregious misconduct may be used to meet the plaintiff’s burden of 
proof.”). 
 251. Id. at 536. 
 252. The fact-specific nature of exploring the mental state of an employer makes this 
inquiry particularly difficult to quantify. The analytical model proposed here is thus intended to 
be simply one way of analyzing punitive damages under the statute, and it should be considered 
A3 - SEINER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:52 PM 
508 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:473 
C. MANAGER ACTING WITHIN SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
The third prong of the proposed analytical framework—demonstrating 
that the manager involved acted within the scope of employment—will 
typically be the easiest to establish.253 The Restatement (Second) of Agency 
permits an award of punitive damages against a principal as a result of the 
acts of a managerial employee if that employee is “acting in the scope of 
employment.”254 Under Kolstad and the Restatement, this means that the 
manager’s actions are of “the kind [the employee] is employed to perform,” 
that the conduct “occurs substantially within the authorized time and space 
limits,” and that the actions are “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to 
serve the employer.”255 
As discussed in greater detail below, Kolstad suggests that almost all 
adverse employment acts taken by a supervisor against an employee will fall 
within the scope of employment, even where those acts are intentional.256 
This is true because when an employer violates Title VII, it has taken an 
action against an employee that affects the “terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment” of that individual.257 A manager’s violation of Title VII, 
then, will typically occur at work, during normal business hours, and with 
the authority given to that supervisor—thus placing the conduct squarely 
within the scope of employment.258 Obvious exceptions come to mind—
such as where a supervisor harasses an employee after hours and away from 
the place of business. But even this kind of harassing conduct will typically 
still involve some type of workplace component. And where there is simply 
no relationship to the conduct in question and the workplace environment, 
it is likely that the actions will not fall within the ambit of Title VII at all, let 
alone entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages.259 
 
a flexible approach. In those circumstances where the facts are unusual or do not fit the typical 
pattern of an employment discrimination case, the courts and litigants should look beyond the 
confines of the model set forth here. See infra Part V (setting forth the limitations of the model). 
 253. See, e.g., Monteagudo v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 
554 F.3d 164, 176 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that plaintiff can impute liability “by showing that the 
employee who discriminated against her was a managerial agent acting within the scope of his 
employment” (quoting Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399 F.3d 52, 64 (1st 
Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 
431, 444 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that Kolstad “adopt[ed] [the] Restatement (Second) of 
Agency’s scope of employment test for intentional torts but modif[ied] it to provide a good-
faith exception”); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing the scope of the employment test from Kolstad). 
 254. See generally Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542–43 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 217C (1957)). 
 255. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 256. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543–45. 
 257. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 258. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543. 
 259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
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Thus, to satisfy the third component of the proposed model, an 
employee must demonstrate that the offending manager was acting within 
the scope of employment.260 In the typical Title VII case—where a supervisor 
has taken an adverse action against a worker that affects the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment—that supervisor will be acting 
within the scope-of-employment as interpreted through the rules of agency 
and the Kolstad decision.261 Nonetheless, litigants should still make certain 
that the facts do not present an unusual set of circumstances where this 
component of the proposed model would be called into question.262 
D. GOOD-FAITH EFFORTS 
The fourth prong of the proposed analytical model for punitive 
damages provides an affirmative defense for employers. Under this defense, 
if the employer can demonstrate that it made good-faith efforts to comply 
with Title VII, it can completely evade liability for punitive damages under 
the statute.263 This defense has its roots in the Kolstad decision and the 
principles of agency. 
As noted above, the Restatement requires that a manager be acting 
within the scope of employment to subject an employer to liability for 
punitive damages.264 While this rule is straightforward, the Kolstad Court 
expressed concern over applying the “scope-of-employment” concept to 
workplace punitive damages.265 In this regard, the Court found it 
problematic that under the rules of agency, “an employee may be said to act 
within the scope of employment even if the employee engages in acts 
‘specifically forbidden’ by the employer and uses ‘forbidden means of 
accomplishing results.’”266 Thus, the Court was worried that if the rules of 
agency were strictly applied, they could potentially subject an employer to 
 
 260. See generally Timothy J. Moran, Punitive Damages in Fair Housing Litigation: Ending 
Unwise Restrictions on a Necessary Remedy, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 317–19 (2001) 
(discussing scope-of-employment concept). 
 261. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543–45. 
 262. Another scenario that could call the “scope-of-employment” test into question would 
be where an individual is retaliated against outside of the workplace after complaining of the 
employer’s discriminatory conduct. See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (“Title VII’s substantive provision and its antiretaliation provision are not 
coterminous. The scope of the antiretaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or 
employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”). Given the somewhat lower threshold for what 
constitutes a retaliatory act, as opposed to a substantive violation under the statute, Title VII 
retaliation claims should be examined particularly closely to make certain that the manager’s 
conduct occurs within the scope of employment. See id. at 67–68. 
 263. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545–46. See generally Seiner, supra note 4, at 783–86 (discussing 
good-faith defense). 
 264. See generally id. at 542–43 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C 
(1957)). 
 265. Id. at 544–45. 
 266. Id. at 544 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 230 cmt. B). 
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liability for punitive damages for the unlawful conduct of a managerial 
employee even where the company “makes every effort to comply with Title 
VII.”267 
As a result of these concerns, the Kolstad Court modified the scope-of-
employment concept to include a “good-faith-efforts” exception for the 
employer.268 Under this defense, for purposes of punitive damages, “an 
employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment 
decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the 
employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.’”269 By creating this 
defense, the Court hoped to avoid the possible “perverse incentives” of the 
scope-of-employment concept, as well as to “promote prevention as well as 
remediation” by encouraging employers to comply with the terms of the 
statute.270 In the Court’s view, such a defense would likely promote the use 
of antidiscrimination polices and training on employment discrimination 
laws by employers.271 
After Kolstad, then, we look to a modified “scope-of-employment” test 
when considering whether punitive damages are applicable in a case.272 
Thus, in addition to considering whether the manager involved in the 
unlawful conduct was acting within the scope of employment, we should also 
examine whether the employer made good-faith efforts to comply with the 
statute.273 This raises the obvious question of what facts are necessary to 
establish whether the employer is acting in good faith. The Kolstad decision 
suggests that implementing an antidiscrimination policy and conducting 
training on employment discrimination laws for workers could be two ways 
of demonstrating an employer’s good faith.274 And, indeed, having an 
effective policy in place and training workers on the provisions of Title VII 
are often cited by the lower courts as important considerations when 
evaluating an employer’s purported good faith.275 
 
 267. Id. The Court further noted that if the scope-of-employment concept were applied to 
Title VII it “would reduce the incentive for employers to implement antidiscrimination 
programs.” Id. Indeed, “such a rule would likely exacerbate concerns among employers that 
§ 1981a’s ‘malice’ and ‘reckless indifference’ standard penalizes those employers who educate 
themselves and their employees on Title VII’s prohibitions.” Id. 
 268. Id. at 545–46. 
 269. Id. at 545 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(Tatel, J., dissenting)). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 542–46. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See, e.g., Monteagudo v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 
554 F.3d 164, 176–77 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing good-faith standard); McInnis v. Fairfield 
Cmtys., Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); Zimmermann v. Assocs. First 
Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 385–86 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
206 F.3d 431, 446 (4th Cir. 2000) (same). 
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Indeed, surveying the decisions of the lower courts, it becomes much 
clearer what type of conduct an employer must engage in to avoid punitive 
damages liability through its good-faith efforts.276 The first—and most 
important—hurdle in this regard is that the employer must have some type 
of antidiscrimination policy in place.277 Without an antidiscrimination 
policy, it will be almost impossible for an employer to avail itself of this 
defense.278 Having a clear, definite, and extensive policy will also prove 
helpful to the employer.279 Additionally, a company must do more than 
simply adopt an antidiscrimination policy—it must demonstrate that the 
policy is effectively maintained and enforced.280 In this regard, the employer 
should strive to abide by its policies and try not to apply them 
inconsistently.281 A company should also educate and train its employees 
both on its policies and how to prevent employment discrimination more 
generally.282 Finally, an employer must respond to employee complaints that 
it receives through the mechanisms established in its policies.283 Whether an 
employer engages in good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII is certainly a 
fact-intensive inquiry. However, by adopting an extensive antidiscrimination 
policy that is both effectively and consistently maintained and enforced, an 
 
 276. One court lamented that “Kolstad provides us no definitive standard for determining 
what constitutes good-faith compliance with the antidiscrimination requirements.” EEOC v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 277. See West v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 374 F. App’x 624, 639 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting the 
importance of a company antidiscrimination policy for purposes of avoiding imposition of 
punitive damages); Monteagudo, 554 F.3d at 176–77 (same); McInnis, 458 F.3d at 1138 (same); 
Anderson v. G.D.C., Inc., 281 F.3d 452, 461 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); Davey v. Lockheed Martin, 
301 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2002) (same); Lowery, 206 F.3d at 446 (same). 
 278. See supra note 277. 
 279. See Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that an employer policy of simply encouraging employees to report grievances to 
management was insufficient to establish good-faith defense). 
 280. See West, 374 F. App’x at 639 (“An employer will not be shielded simply by having an 
antidiscrimination policy. It must demonstrate that it engaged in good-faith efforts to 
implement that policy.”); Monteagudo, 554 F.3d at 176–77 (noting the importance of following 
company policy); McInnis, 458 F.3d at 1138 (noting the importance of enforcing company 
policy); Zimmermann, 251 F.3d at 385 (same); Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1210 
(10th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 281. See Tisdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 533 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that the 
plaintiff “presented evidence of a number of inconsistent practices . . . which calls into question 
[defendant’s] sincerity to abide by its own written [antidiscrimination] policies”). 
 282. See Monteagudo, 554 F.3d at 176–77 (noting the importance of education for good-
faith defense); McInnis, 458 F.3d at 1138 (same); Davey, 301 F.3d at 1209 (same); Anderson, 281 
F.3d at 461 (noting the importance of training for good-faith defense). 
 283. See West, 374 F. App’x at 639 (discussing the sufficiency of company response to 
discrimination); Golson v. Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp., 26 F. App’x 209, 215 (4th Cir. 
2002) (same); Hertzberg v. SRAM Corp., 261 F.3d 651, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2001) (same). 
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employer will go a long way toward satisfying this good-faith inquiry, as well 
as the fourth prong of the proposed analytical framework.284 
One final consideration for the good-faith-efforts defense is where the 
burden of proof lies with this element. There is no definitive rule for which 
party bears the burden of proof with this test,285 though Kolstad seems to 
treat the good-faith-efforts inquiry as an affirmative defense for the 
employer.286 Additionally, the lower courts have generally placed the burden 
of proof for the good-faith-compliance question on the company.287 Thus, 
while there is not a definitive answer to where the burden of proof lies for 
this inquiry, both the reasoning of the Supreme Court and the trend in the 
lower courts strongly suggest that this is an affirmative defense for the 
employer to establish.288 As such, the analytical framework for punitive 
damages proposed here will similarly place the burden of proof on the 
employer for this good-faith test. 
E. JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The final element of the proposed analytical framework for analyzing 
whether a punitive damages jury instruction is appropriate in a Title VII 
employment discrimination case is optional and proposes giving the jury this 
instruction even in those circumstances where the court is otherwise 
inclined to deny the plaintiff’s request for exemplary relief. In these 
situations, the court should strongly consider allowing the jury to decide the 
issue but entertain a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law 
(“JMOL”) from the defendant following the trial.289 Thus, if the court 
permits the jury to resolve the underlying question of whether the employer 
intentionally discriminated against the employee, at a minimum, the court 
should further give the jury the question of what amount of punitive relief is 
appropriate in the case (if any). Whether the court ultimately allows the 
 
 284. See Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering Compliance and 
Liability, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1623, 1641–43 (2007) (discussing employer policies and training 
efforts). See generally Powell & Crane, supra note 237 (providing an overview of the good-faith-
efforts defense and various circumstances where courts will accept or reject the defense). 
 285. See, e.g., Davey, 301 F.3d at 1209 (noting that “[i]t is unclear whether the good-faith-
compliance standard set out in Kolstad represents an affirmative defense on which the 
defendant bears the burden of poof or whether the plaintiff must disprove the defendant’s 
good faith compliance with Title VII” (quoting Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1209 n.4) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 286. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999). 
 287. See Davey, 301 F.3d at 1209 & n.4 (citing Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 
251 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2001); Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 670 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 516 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999)) (not 
resolving the question of which party has the burden of proof for the good-faith test, but noting 
that a number of circuits “have determined the defense is an affirmative one”). 
 288. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543–46; see also supra note 287. 
 289. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)–(b). 
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jury’s punitive damages verdict to stand, however, is ultimately within its own 
discretion.290 
Jury trials are expensive and time-consuming endeavors.291 If a district 
court declines to give a punitive damages instruction to a jury and is 
subsequently overturned, another jury must be empaneled to resolve this 
question.292 Indeed, in at least one jurisdiction, the entire case may have to 
be retried if the appellate court overturns the lower court on the question of 
exemplary relief.293 And, as demonstrated earlier, it is not an uncommon 
result for a district court to be overturned on its decision to restrict punitive 
damages in an employment discrimination case.294 To save significant 
judicial resources in these matters, then, a district court—when inclined to 
deny punitive relief—should still ask the jury whether punitive damages are 
appropriate and in what amount they should be awarded. The court may 
then strike the award following the defendant’s renewed motion for JMOL. 
If the district court is subsequently overturned on the punitive damages 
question, the jury’s verdict could then be reinstated, completely obviating 
the need to retry the matter. 
There may be some concern that providing the jury with this somewhat 
advisory determination of exemplary relief may distort the verdict. In this 
regard, perhaps a jury would have awarded a victim greater compensatory 
 
 290. Id. 
 291. See, e.g., Lucille M. Ponte, Putting Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Back on the Docket: 
Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial Authority, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1069, 1078 n.68 (1995) 
(“A jury trial, even one of summary nature, however, requires at minimum the time-consuming 
process of assembling a panel and (one would hope) thorough preparation for argument by 
counsel, no matter how brief the actual proceeding.” (quoting In re NLO Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 158 
(6th Cir. 1993)). 
 292. See, e.g., EEOC v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
reversing the district court’s flawed decision not to give a punitive damages instruction to the 
jury “requires that we remand for a new trial, solely on the issue of punitive damages”); see also 
EEOC v. Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Assocs., 578 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the “district court erred in granting [defendant] judgment as a matter of law on 
[certain] punitive-damages claims” and remanding “for a new trial solely on the issue of 
punitive damages”). 
 293. See, e.g., EEOC v. Stocks, Inc., 228 F. App’x 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
district court erred in failing to give punitive damages instruction and stating that “[a] future 
jury’s decision to award punitive damages will be tied to the same evidence of intent as will be 
the liability decision, and the factual dispute surrounding the events leading to [the victim’s] 
suspension will be central to the decision that [the defendant] retaliated in reckless 
indifference to her rights. . . . By our remand, we leave to the [plaintiff] the choice of whether it 
wants a new trial on all issues, or wishes instead to retain its judgment [without punitive 
damages]”). 
 294. See supra Part III.D (discussing the Siouxland, Heartway, and Stocks, Inc. employment 
discrimination cases, where the federal appellate courts overturned the decisions of the district 
courts not to permit the respective juries to consider punitive relief); cf. Alvarado v. Fed. 
Express Corp., 384 F. App’x 585, 590 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because we have affirmed the jury’s 
verdict and award of compensatory damages, we remand for a new trial solely on the state and 
federal law claims for punitive liability and damages.”). 
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damages or backpay if it believed that punitive damages were unavailable in 
the case. While the proposed approach may present this practical difficulty, 
it should be noted that juries should not be adjusting their other award 
determinations based on the availability of punitive relief. Furthermore, the 
significant efficiencies created by allowing the jury to reach the punitive 
damages issue should outweigh any concerns that juries might 
inappropriately adjust their overall damages determination based on the 
instruction. 
Thus, the final component of the proposed analytical framework is 
optional and is targeted primarily at enhancing efficiencies in the judicial 
system. Where a court is inclined not to allow punitive damages in a case 
that will otherwise be decided by a jury, the court should still allow the jury 
to consider the question of exemplary relief on an advisory basis. 
F. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the proposed five-part analytical framework for analyzing 
punitive damages claims set forth above, there are some additional 
considerations that the litigants and courts should evaluate when addressing 
these issues. These concerns arise primarily from the Philip Morris and Exxon 
decisions on punitive damages discussed above.295 Though not arising in the 
employment discrimination context, these cases are instructive and the 
courts should still consider the possible implications of the decisions. As 
already noted, the primary holding from Philip Morris is that a jury may 
consider harm incurred by strangers to the litigation for purposes of 
considering reprehensibility—but not punishment—when awarding punitive 
damages.296 
The main lesson from Philip Morris for employment discrimination 
litigants is that Title VII plaintiffs may be unable to use the discriminatory 
experiences of their coworkers to further punish the employer.297 Instead, 
these individuals would be left to couch the experiences of their coworkers 
in terms of the reprehensible nature of the employer’s conduct.298 To the 
extent Philip Morris is applicable to a federal law such as Title VII, then, the 
federal courts should strongly consider restricting the use of evidence of 
third-party harm for the purpose of attempting to punish the employer 
through punitive relief.299 Thus, after Philip Morris, a court should carefully 
evaluate how this type of evidence is presented to a jury, if at all. 
Similarly, in Exxon, the Supreme Court held that where federal 
common law is in place to address punitive relief, due process concerns are 
 
 295. See supra Parts II–III (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions on exemplary relief). 
 296. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 297. Id. at 354. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
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not implicated.300 After Exxon, then, it is clear that the courts need not reach 
the due process issues raised in Gore and State Farm when addressing 
employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII.301 When 
evaluating a jury’s award of punitive relief after Exxon, the court and litigants 
should therefore not be concerned with the “guideposts” set forth in Gore or 
(more specifically) with the ratio of punitive relief to actual harm in a Title 
VII case. Any award of exemplary relief that falls within the permitted 
statutory range—up to $300,000 for the largest employers—should satisfy 
the constitutional standards.302 The Court’s decision in Exxon thus makes it 
much more likely that a jury’s award of punitive damages in a Title VII case 
will stand and makes a court’s job much easier in reviewing the award. 
Certainly, a punitive damages award may still be reviewed for 
excessiveness, and there may well be circumstances where a reduction of the 
award is still appropriate. The most obvious scenario where an award should 
be reduced, for example, would be where the amount is in excess of the 
statutory limits.303 Nonetheless, after Exxon, a court’s role in reviewing the 
amount of the award should be fairly limited in an employment 
discrimination case. 
In sum, despite the fact that the recent Philip Morris and Exxon Supreme 
Court decisions did not involve Title VII, the cases certainly have strong 
implications for employment discrimination claimants who seek punitive 
relief. The courts and parties should thus strongly consider whether these 
cases impact the facts or claims of any workplace litigation. 
G. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
The five-part analytical framework for evaluating punitive damages in 
employment discrimination cases attempts to provide clarity to an otherwise 
confused area of the law. The model navigates the Kolstad, Philip Morris, and 
Exxon Supreme Court decisions to provide a simplified test for courts and 
litigants to use when analyzing these cases. And, most importantly, this 
model answers the difficult question left by Kolstad—what with malice or with 
reckless indifference means for the typical workplace litigant. In conclusion, 
when analyzing whether a punitive damages instruction should be given to a 
jury in an employment discrimination case brought pursuant to Title VII, 
the courts and litigants should evaluate: 
1. Whether a supervisor is responsible for the unlawful conduct; 
2. whether the supervisor had knowledge of Title VII; 
3. whether the supervisor was acting within the scope of employment; 
 
 300. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501–02 (2008). 
 301. Id. As discussed earlier, the federal case law of Title VII, along with the cap for punitive 
damages in the statute, combine to satisfy any constitutional concerns over punitive relief. See 
supra Part III.C (discussing workplace implications of Exxon decision). 
 302. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006). 
 303. Id. 
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4. whether the employer was acting in good faith; and 
5. whether the court should allow the punitive damages question to go 
to the jury even where it is inclined to deny punitive relief. 
In analyzing these factors, the burden of proof is also critical to 
consider. The employee must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the first 
three elements of the framework by demonstrating that a management-level 
employee—acting within the scope of employment—was both responsible 
for the unlawful conduct and aware of the requirements of the statute. The 
employer may still avoid punitive damages for the unlawful conduct if it can 
satisfy the fourth element of the test by showing that it made good-faith 
efforts to comply with Title VII. Finally, if the court is inclined against 
awarding punitive relief, it should still ask the jury whether punitive damages 
are appropriate and in what amount they should be awarded. The court may 
then strike the award following the defendant’s renewed motion for JMOL. 
If the district court is subsequently overturned on the punitive damages 
question, this jury verdict could be reinstated, avoiding the need to retry any 
part of the case. 
When considering the presentation of evidence on punitive damages to 
the jury, the court should also keep in mind the possible limitations of Philip 
Morris. Thus, a court should be hesitant to allow the jury to punish an 
employer for harm caused to strangers to the litigation, though such 
evidence can be used for purposes of showing reprehensibility. Similarly, 
after Exxon, once the jury awards punitive damages in a Title VII case, the 
court’s role in reviewing the amount of the award should be limited. The 
court may, however, analyze the award for excessiveness. 
By analyzing whether punitive damages are appropriate pursuant to this 
proposed analytical model, courts and litigants will satisfy the standards set 
forth in Kolstad and the recent Supreme Court decisions on this issue. 
Though the proposed model is simply one way of examining these cases, it 
can be used for many Title VII claims.304 And while the courts have struggled 
with how to comply with Kolstad, the proposed model clearly and concisely 
articulates whether an employment discrimination plaintiff is entitled to 
exemplary relief. 
V. LIMITATIONS OF PROPOSED MODEL 
Though the analytical model for examining punitive damages in the 
workplace will provide simplicity to a currently confused process, the model 
is not without its limitations. Most notably, the proposed model is intended 
to apply only to individual cases of disparate treatment discrimination. 
Though the same basic principles set forth in this Article can also be applied 
to class action or systemic litigation, such cases must be analyzed much more 
carefully when determining whether exemplary relief is appropriate. And as 
 
 304. See infra Part V (discussing limitations of proposed model). 
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punitive damages are only appropriate in cases where intentional 
discrimination has been established, the model would certainly be 
inapplicable to disparate impact cases (which involve unintentional 
discrimination). The model set forth here should also be used only at the 
close of evidence in a Title VII case, when determining whether a punitive 
damages instruction should be given to the jury. The model should not be 
used at earlier stages of the litigation, other than as a guide for the basic 
principles of punitive damages in the workplace. 
As noted throughout this Article, the model is also intended only for 
cases brought pursuant to Title VII (which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”),305 as well as disability 
cases brought under the ADA. It is not intended for claims brought under 
other civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In particular, it is worth 
noting that claims brought under § 1981 will deserve special analysis, as this 
statute does not impose statutory caps on punitive relief like Title VII.306 
Thus, while beyond the scope of this Article, the question of the extent to 
which the Exxon decision will apply to § 1981 claims should be addressed.307 
Additionally, the model proposed here must be adapted to the 
principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton308 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth309 when considering 
whether punitive damages are appropriate in harassment cases.310 Similarly, 
the Court’s jurisprudence on retaliation claims, as recently discussed in 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,311 must be considered 
when determining whether punitive relief is appropriate for a case alleging 
unlawful reprisal. Harassment claims and retaliation cases present special 
Title VII factual scenarios, then, and the proposed model should only be 
used with these Supreme Court cases in mind. 
As the above limitations make clear, the model proposed here is simply 
one way of analyzing whether punitive damages are appropriate in cases 
involving workplace discrimination.312 Certainly, there are many other ways 
of determining whether exemplary relief is appropriate, and the facts of 
each particular case must be carefully analyzed. Nonetheless, the model set 
 
 305. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 306. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); see also Sperino, Judicial Preemption of Punitive Damages, supra 
note 13, at 235 (noting that there are no statutory caps in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims). 
 307. See supra Section III.C (discussing application of Exxon to Title VII cases). 
 308. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 309. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 310. See supra Part IV.A (discussing whether punitive damages would apply in cases 
involving coworker harassment). 
 311. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 312. For example, as Professor Sandra Sperino correctly points out in her excellent 
response to this Article, employers may also be responsible for punitive damages via direct 
liability. See Sandra F. Sperino, Direct Liability for Punitive Damages, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
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forth in this Article provides a simple, straightforward way of analyzing 
punitive damages in many Title VII employment discrimination cases. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
The model proposed here for analyzing workplace punitive damages 
claims has many implications for this area of the law.313 Perhaps the most 
significant benefit of the proposed model is its simplicity. The framework 
takes a confused area of the law and provides a straightforward way of 
resolving the otherwise complex issue of exemplary relief. The courts and 
litigants should thus easily be able to apply this model to Title VII cases to 
determine whether punitive relief is appropriate. And the model simplifies 
and explains how the recent Supreme Court cases on punitive damages 
should apply in the employment discrimination context. Similarly, the 
model clearly addresses what evidence is necessary to establish malice or 
reckless indifference after the Court’s decision in Kolstad. Thus, a plaintiff 
successfully navigating the elements of the proposed analytical framework 
will have established (under the statute and relevant Supreme Court 
precedent) the requisite mental state of the employer. As demonstrated 
above, this question has led to conflicting decisions in the federal courts. 
The model thus makes sense of Kolstad, Philip Morris, and Exxon and 
explains—in simple terms—how these decisions should be applied to 
employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII.314 
By providing a uniform model, the proposed framework should also 
bring much more certainty to the damages analysis of workplace 
discrimination claims. Cases analyzing workplace punitive damages have 
resulted in varying opinions and confused analyses.315 By bringing 
uniformity to this area of the law, the courts and litigants will much more 
easily be able to evaluate the potential damages in a particular case. And 
with more certainty in the process comes the increased likelihood that more 
workplace claims will settle before reaching litigation.316 Through simplicity 
and uniformity, then, the proposed analytical framework set forth in the 
Article should help the parties to better evaluate workplace punitive 
damages claims and, thus, better allows the statute to effectively achieve the 
goals associated with exemplary relief. 
 
 313. See generally Seiner, supra note 4 (discussing analysis of punitive damages in 
employment discrimination cases and implications of a proposed model). 
 314. See generally supra Part IV (setting forth parameters of proposed model for analyzing 
punitive relief in employment discrimination cases). 
 315. See supra Part III.D (discussing difficulty lower courts have encountered when applying 
Kolstad decision). 
 316. See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in 
Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655, 662 (“The more certain the law—the less the 
variance in expected outcomes—the more likely the parties will predict the same outcome from 
litigation, and the less likely that litigation will occur because of differences in predicted 
outcomes.”). 
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Some might argue that the proposed model is too rigid and takes 
necessary discretion away from the courts when analyzing workplace 
discrimination claims. While there should be concern over adopting an 
inflexible model, the framework set forth in this Article is not intended to be 
overly rigid, and the courts have significant leeway in applying the various 
factors to the specific facts of the case. Additionally, as already noted, this 
model is simply one way of evaluating whether punitive damages are 
appropriate in a particular case.317 The courts and parties are free to use 
other methods of evaluating the cases as well, particularly where there is an 
unusual fact pattern that would call for a more specialized analysis. 
It could also be argued that the proposed model is unnecessary as the 
courts have been resolving workplace claims for over a decade after the 
Kolstad decision. While Kolstad certainly helped provide much needed 
guidance on when punitive relief is appropriate in employment 
discrimination cases, in many ways the decision generated more questions 
than answers, resulting in confused lower court decisions. The model 
proposed here assists the courts in evaluating employment discrimination 
claims and could help bring some uniformity to this process. Thus, while the 
courts have used the Kolstad decision to analyze workplace claims, the 
analytical framework proposed here simplifies the analysis. Moreover, the 
proposed model helps clarify how the more recent Supreme Court decisions 
in Philip Morris and Exxon might impact Title VII claims. By explaining how 
these cases should apply to Title VII claims, the analytical framework could 
help avoid years of unnecessary litigation on this topic. 
In the end, any concerns over the proposed punitive damages model 
are outweighed by the simplicity and uniformity that the framework brings 
to Title VII claims. By providing greater efficiency to the judicial process, the 
analytical framework set forth in this Article should greatly enhance the 
evaluation of punitive relief in employment discrimination cases. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Analyzing a punitive damages claim brought in the workplace context is 
fraught with problems. In the years following Kolstad, there have been 
divisive and conflicting opinions in the lower courts, as well as a general 
confusion over the applicability of the remedial provisions of Title VII. By 
offering an analytical framework for assessing exemplary relief in 
employment discrimination cases, this Article seeks to end that confusion. 
The proposed model integrates the critical lessons from Kolstad and makes 
sense of the more recent Exxon and Philip Morris decisions. By providing 
much needed clarity and simplicity to this area of the law, this Article 
attempts to help shape the future of workplace punitive damages. 
 
 317. See supra Part V (discussing limitations of proposed model). 
